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Abstract
In exploring the impact of tax policy on labor-market performance, the paper
first investigates how tax reform impacts labor supply and equilibrium unemploy-
ment in representative agent models. The impact of tax policy on labor mar-
ket performance depends importantly on various other labor-market institutions,
such as minimum wage laws, wage bargaining, and unemployment benefits. In
non-competitive labor markets, employment declines if a higher tax burden makes
the outside option (i.e. unemployment) relatively more attractive. Marginal tax
rates typically differ substantially across individuals. To explore the impact of
specific tax policies, therefore, the paper relies on an applied general equilibrium
model to investigate the consequences of tax reform with heterogeneous house-
holds. The model simulations reveal several trade-offs between various objectives,
such as cutting unemployment, stimulating the participation of secondary workers
into the labor force, raising the quality and quantity of labor supply, and estab-
lishing an equitable income distribution. The paper also analyses how efficiency
considerations affect the optimal progressiveness of labor income taxes. Finally,
the optimal progression of the labor income tax is investigated in the presence of
search unemployment, heterogeneous households and distributional concerns.
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21 Introduction
This paper explores the link between tax policy and labor-market performance. As far as
labor-performance is concerned, we focus on labor supply, employment and the difference
between these two variables: unemployment. As regards tax policy, we consider a
number of elements: first, the level of taxation as measured by average tax burdens
for major groups of workers; second, the composition of the tax burden over payroll
taxes, personal labor income taxes, capital income taxes, and consumption taxes; third,
the progressiveness of the tax system (as measured by the speed with which average tax
rates rise with income levels) and — related to this — the magnitude of marginal tax rates
for workers with middle- and high incomes; and fourth, marginal tax rates faced by low-
income earners and non-participating or unemployed individuals as a result of means-
tested safety-net provisions and retirement benefits. The analysis is mainly theoretical.
Nevertheless, at several stages we survey evidence on the empirical importance of various
theoretical mechanisms.
The paper is structured as follows. After section 2 provides information about the
tax and benefit systems in various OECD countries, the paper turns to the labor-market
effects of taxation in representative agents models. Section 3 explores how tax reform im-
pacts employment through the channels of labor supply and equilibrium unemployment.
Section 4 investigates how efficiency considerations affect the optimal progressiveness of
labor income taxes. Sections 5 and 6 account for distributional considerations by al-
lowing for heterogeneous workers. In particular, Section 5 employs an applied general
equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to investigate the consequences of tax re-
form for not only the labor market but also the income distribution. Section 6 constructs
a framework for exploring the optimal progression of the labor income tax in the pres-
ence of search unemployment, heterogeneous households and distributional concerns.
Section 7, finally, summarizes the main policy conclusions.
2 Taxes and labor-market performance
Labor-market performance can be assessed in several ways. This paper focuses on
unemployment and labor supply, which can be measured as the participation rate (i.e.
the labor force as percentage of the working age population (15-65)) and average number
of hours worked by employees (see Table 1). Together, unemployment and labor supply
yield employment. The fifth column of Table 1 gives the average hours worked per
3member of the working-age population as a percentage of a full-time workweek (of 40
hours). This can be considered as the best available aggregate measure of labor-market
performance. Table 1 ranks countries in decreasing order of this aggregate performance
measure. On this measure, the United States, Canada and Japan perform better than
Europe and continental Europe in particular. Within Europe, the largest continental
European countries (Germany, France and Italy) do worse than most other European
countries.
Also tax policy can be assessed in different ways. Table 2, which ranks countries
according to their aggregate labor-market performance, contains average tax rates and
marginal tax rates at different income levels for a single-person household.1 The tax
wedges used here include personal income taxes, employers’ and employees’ social se-
curity contributions,2 payroll taxes, and indirect consumption taxes (such as VAT and
excises). The marginal tax wedge drives a wedge between marginal labor costs (which a
competitive, profit-maximizing employer equates to the marginal productivity of labor
(i.e. the social benefit of labor)) and after-tax disposable income from work (which a
utility-maximizing household sets equal to the monetary value of the marginal disutility
of labor (i.e. the reservation wage or the social costs of labor)). Tax rates are quite high.
Marginal tax rates for the average production worker exceed 60 % in most countries on
the European continent. Although marginal rates of personal income tax generally rise
with income, overall marginal tax rates do not rise substantially with income. This is
because social security contributions are typically due only on incomes below a ceiling.
The United Kingdom and the United States combine high employment rates with rel-
atively low marginal and average tax burdens. Within continental Europe, however,
labor-market performance and tax rates do not show a clear correlation.
Also other taxes may harm the reward to labor, even though they are not assessed
on labor income. To illustrate, by reducing labor productivity, source-based taxes on
capital may be shifted unto labor in a small open economy with internationally mobile
capital. These implicit taxes on labor are not included in Table 2. The same holds true
for labor-market regulations that give rise to implicit taxes on employment. Minimum
wage policies, for example, in effect levy implicit taxes on employers hiring low-skilled
workers, with the revenues being transferred to these workers.3 Other implicit taxes on
1
The data are for an average production worker who is 40 years of age. For more details, see OECD
(2002b).
2
The marginal tax rates assume that social security contributions are not linked to insurance benefits
on an individual level.
3
Neary and Roberts (1980) show how rigid wages and prices can be modelled as implicit tax rates.
4employers are employment regulations that constrain the ability of employers to reduce
the labor force in response to weak business conditions. By reducing labor demand, the
implicit taxes associated with these regulations harm employment.
For low income levels, the average andmarginal tax burdens as contained in Table 2
become a less reliable indicator of the incentives to supply labor because social insurance
benefits and means-tested welfare benefits (including other safety-net benefits, such as
housing allowances) imply significant implicit tax burdens on work. Indeed, many of
these benefits are withdrawn when a worker finds work or works more hours. To provide
some information about the magnitude of these implicit tax rates, Table 3 contains the
replacement rates (in after-tax terms) for both short-term and long-run unemployed.
The desire to protect households with young children from poverty implies that lone-
parent families and two-parent families feature the highest replacement rates. These
replacement rates are closely related to the effective marginal tax rate on finding a
full-time job. In particular, to arrive at the overall implicit rate on work t¯, one should
perform the following calculation: t¯ = t+(1− t)r, where t is the (average) tax wedge (as
given in the first three columns of Table 2, but then for the relevant household types)
and r is the net replacement rate (as provided in Table 3).
Table 4 contains the implicit tax rates for several transitions.4 In particular, the
first two columns consider the transition of an unemployed average production worker,
with a non-employed spouse and two children, to part-time employment (40 %) and
full-time employment, respectively. The third and fourth columns present the effective
tax rates for a secondary earner previously out of the labor force who starts working
part-time or full-time, while the principal earner within the same household continues to
work full-time. These data reveal that effective tax rates on principal earners typically
substantially exceed those on secondary earners. The main reason is the benefit system.
In particular, means-tested benefits and unemployment benefits are withdrawn if the
principal earner finds work. Secondary earners do not have access to welfare benefits if
the primary worker (i.e. the breadwinner) is employed. Moreover, if they do not have an
employment history, these workers are also ineligible for benefits from unemployment
insurance. Table 4 reveals that effective tax rates differ substantially across various
households, even within the same country.
The first two columns of Table 4 suggest that marginal effective tax rates are
particularly high for primary workers at the bottom of the labor market, especially
since many OECD countries have cut top marginal tax rates over the last two decennia.
4
In contrast to the figures in Table 2, these figures abstract from indirect taxes on consumption.
5Another important reason why marginal tax rates are highest at the bottom of the labor
market is that unemployment insurance benefits for high-income earners are typically
only limited in duration. For high-income earners, therefore, the short-run replacement
rates on which the data in Table 4 are based may overstate disincentives to seek work.
For low-income earners, in contrast, safety-net provisions, which are typically unlimited
in duration, imply high replacement rates for longer periods of time. A comparison
between the short-run and long-run replacement rates in Table 3 does indeed reveal that
benefits tend to drop less over time for low-income earners, thus producing higher long-
run replacement rates than for those earning higher incomes. This implies substantial
disincentives for low-income earners. Indeed, the duration rather than the magnitude
of unemployment benefits may be the main determinant of disincentives to work and
maintain human capital.
Older workers often face very high marginal tax rates on continuing to work be-
cause early retirement benefits are withdrawn if workers continue to work instead of
retire. In any case, pension benefits are typically not increased in an actuarially fair
manner if older workers delay retirement. Gruber and Wise (1999) show that marginal
tax rates for older workers may sometimes exceed 100 %. Their analysis reveals that
high marginal tax rates on older workers are strongly correlated with labor-force par-
ticipation of older workers, which is in fact quite low in most European countries (see
the next-to-last column in Table 1). In addition to workers facing these high explicit
tax rates, employers of older workers may be subject to implicit tax rates as a result of
downward rigid wages. The government could offset these implicit taxes by explicit job
subsidies for employers who employ older workers. These job subsidies, however, need to
be financed through distortionary taxation. A more direct way to protect employment of
older workers is to make wages of older workers more flexible. In this way, wages can be
more in line with individual productivity. To achieve this, age-related pay schemes have
to be reconsidered. For example, occupational pension systems that link pension bene-
fits to final pay discourage gradual retirement through occupational downgrading with
lower rates of pay. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) show how generous unemployment
and disability benefits that are based on previous earnings prevent the labor market
from easily adjusting to adverse shocks. In particular, in the face of generous insurance
benefits that exceed their labor productivity, older skilled workers who suffer a substan-
tial capital loss on their human capital (e.g. as a result of being laid off) are discouraged
from searching for new jobs and from reducing their reservation wage in line with their
reduced productivity. In this way, social insurance sets in motion a vicious circle of high
6unemployment and skill loss. This explains the high incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment and disability among European workers (see the last column of Table 1). As the
work force ages, these moral hazard problems associated with social insurance benefits
based on previous earnings become more serious. Indeed, social insurance benefits based
on final pay discourage workers from maintaining their human capital, since workers can
rely on generous social benefits when their human capital becomes obsolete. Private in-
surance policies supplementing public disability and unemployment insurances worsen
these moral hazard problems (see Pauly (1974)).5
Welfare, unemployment and early retirement benefits are typically conditional ben-
efits. In particular, unemployment benefits are paid only if one has left one’s job in-
voluntarily and if one is actively looking for work. Furthermore, many countries are
enforcing obligations on welfare recipients, sometimes in the form of welfare-to-work
programs or workfare programs. Early retirement benefits may be similar to disability
benefits in that they are conditional on failing health. Countries may differ substan-
tially in the eligibility criteria for categorical benefits like unemployment and disability
benefits and in how strictly they enforce these criteria.6 In interpreting the replacement
rates and implicit tax rates in Tables 3 and 4, one needs to be aware of these consider-
ations. Indeed, the duration of the benefits and the obligations associated with social
benefits (workfare, training, work tests) are key aspects of the design of unemployment
insurance.7
3 Tax reform and employment
This section uses representative agent models to explore the impacts of tax reform
on employment. It first considers the channel of labor supply before it turns to the
channel of equilibrium unemployment. The analysis in this section is positive rather
than normative. Normative aspects of labor taxation in representative agent models are
explored in section 4.
5
The data in Tables 3 and 4 only account for publicly provided unemployment benefits. Supplemen-
tary, private benefits, which may be provided by the previous employer, sometimes raise replacement
rates further.
6
To illustrate, many countries do not strictly enforce on older unemployed persons the obligation to
look for work in order to be eligible for unemployment or welfare benefits.
7
For a recent overview of the literature on the optimal design of these important elements for
unemployment insurance, see Frederiksson and Holmlund (2003) .
73.1 Labor supply
A representative household derives utility from consumption of goods (C) and leisure
(V ). The utility function U(C, V ) is concave and homothetic. Total time available to
each household is normalized to one, which can be used to enjoy leisure V or to work
Ls = 1−V . The only source of income is labor income. The household budget constraint
is thus given by P cC = (1− T a)WLs, where P c stands for the consumer price and W
denotes the market wage. T a ≡ T (WLs)/WLs represents the average personal income
tax rate on labor, where the income tax paid by the household T (WLs) is a function of
the market value of labor supply. Households determine labor supply from the condition
that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption should equal the
marginal consumer wage, i.e. U
v
/U
c
= (1−Tm)W/P c, where subscripts stand for partial
derivatives. Tm ≡ dT (WLs)/d(WLs) denotes the marginal tax rate on labor income.
Both the marginal and the average tax rates depend on the market value of wage income
WLs.8
Ameasure of the progressivity of the income tax is the elasticity of after-tax la-
bor income with respect to pre-tax labor income, i.e. S ≡ d log(WLs−T (WLs))/d log(WLs) =
(1 − Tm)/(1 − T a). This coefficient is also known as the coefficient of residual income
progression (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976). In a proportional tax system, the average
and the marginal tax rates coincide so that S = 1. In a progressive tax system, in con-
trast, the average tax rate T a ≡ T (WLs)/WLs rises with pre-tax labor income WLs, so
that the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate (i.e. Tm > T a ) and thus S < 1.
We use lower-case variables to denote loglinear deviations from an initial equi-
librium (e.g., c ≡ dC/C), except for the tax rates where we define ti ≡ dT i/(1−T i), i =
a,m. The logarithmic change in the degree of progressivity is thus given by s = ta− tm.
The household budget constraint in relative changes is given by pc+ c = S(w+ ls)− ta.
Together with the loglinearised optimality condition, i.e. c− v = σ(w − tm − pc) where
σ ≡ −d log(C/V )d log(U
c
/U
v
) represents the elasticity of substitution between leisure
and consumption goods in utility, we obtain the relative change in labor supply:9
ls = u(w − pc)− ctm − ita = u(w − ta − pc) + cs. (1)
8
These tax rates may also depend on the personal characteristics of the individual. Moreover, since
the tax authorities observe individual labor incomes, the tax schedule may be non linear in individual
labor income WL
s
.
9
Here we have assumed that the initial coefficient of residual income progression is unity. If this
assumption is not met, labor supply is given by [(S − 1)V + 1]l
s
=

c
(w − t
m
− p
c
) + 
i
(Sw − t
a
− p
c
).
8Here, i ≡ −V < 0, c ≡ V σ > 0, and u ≡ V (σ − 1) = c + i stand for the income,
compensated wage, and uncompensated wage elasticities of labor supply, respectively.
Ceteris paribus the average tax rate T a and the market wageW, a higher marginal
tax rate tm > 0 reduces the opportunity cost of leisure at the margin. Hence, households
substitute leisure for consumption and thus reduce labor supply. The compensated
elasticity of labor supply c reflects the strength of this substitution effect on account of
a more progressive tax system (i.e. s < 0 with ta = 0).
For a given marginal tax rate Tm, a higher average tax ta > 0 makes workers
poorer and thus increases the incentive to work. The magnitude of this income effect is
reflected in the income elasticity of labor supply i. The average and marginal tax rates
thus exert opposite effects on labor supply: whereas higher marginal tax rates harm
labor supply through the substitution effect, higher average tax rates raise it through
the income effect.
If both the marginal and average tax rates are increased in tandem such that
the progression of the tax system is unaffected (i.e. tm = ta so that s = 0), the
uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply (i.e. u = c+ i ) captures the combined
labor-supply impact of the substitution effect of a higher marginal tax rate and the
income effect of a higher average tax rate. The negative substitution effect dominates
the positive income effect on labor supply if the elasticity of substitution between leisure
and consumption goods exceeds unity (i.e. σ > 1) so that the uncompensated wage
elasticity of labor supply is positive.
The previous analysis has assumed that the market wageW is constant. To explore
the impact on the market wage, we model the demand side of the labor market. A repre-
sentative firm maximizes profits, taking wages as given. It may have some market power
on the commodity market in that the (absolute value of) price elasticity of demand for
its output ε remains finite. Profits are given by Π ≡ P
y
(AF (Ld))AF (Ld)−(1+T l)WLd,
where T l denotes the payroll tax rate and Ld represents labor demand. AF (Ld),
F ′ > 0, F” < 0 stands for a production function with diminishing returns to labor.
These diminishing returns are due to a second production factor (e.g. capital), which
is taken as fixed in the short run. Hence, profits originate in not only market power
on commodity markets but also this second production factor. Exogenous technol-
ogy shocks are captured by changes in the productivity parameter A. Firms hire la-
bor until the marginal revenue from the last worker equals the producer wage, i.e.
P
y
(1 − 1
ε
)AF ′(Ld) = (1 + T l)W . Using tl ≡ dT l/(1 + T l), loglinearizing the marginal
productivity condition for firms, and taking the producer price P
y
as numeraire, we
9obtain the relative change in the demand for labor:10
ld = −d(w + tl − a), (2)
where d stands for the wage elasticity of labor demand.11 Expression (2) reveals that
an adverse productivity shock (i.e. a < 0) acts like a payroll tax. Indeed, we investigate
not only changes in explicit taxes on labor income but also exogenous changes in labor
productivity. This enables us to explore the impact of implicit labor taxes that reduce
the productivity of labor. To illustrate, in a small open economy, source-based taxes on
capital act like implicit taxes on labor by reducing the productivity of labor if capital is
perfectly mobile internationally. In the same fashion, if world prices of energy are fixed,
a tax on the intermediate use of energy into production exerts similar adverse effects on
labor productivity.12
In a competitive labor market, the market wage ensures that aggregate labor
supply equals labor demand. Ignoring open economy considerations, we define the
consumer price as P c ≡ 1 + T c, where T c denotes the consumer tax rate. Using
tc ≡ dT c/(1 + T c) = pc and imposing equilibrium on the labor market (i.e. NLs = Ld
where N denotes the fixed number of households), we can solve for employment, wage
costs per unit of output, and the consumer wage:
10
We assume here that firms face a constant price elasticity of demand for their output ε. An increase
in market power, reflected in a decrease in ε, amounts to an implicit tax on labor. Indeed, a relative
change in ε would enter (2) in the same way as t
l
(but with the opposite sign).
If other production factors besides labor are fixed, the labor demand elasticity is given by 
d
≡
1/
[
1−α
σ
f
+
α
ε
]
, where σ
f
is the substitution elasticity between labor and the other production factor(s),
and α ≡ F
′
(L)L/F (L). With a Cobb-Douglas production function (i.e. σ
f
= 1) and a constant price
elasticity ε, the labor demand elasticity is constant, i.e. 
d
≡ 1/
[
1− α(1−
1
ε
)
]
. In that case, a smaller
share of fixed factors (i.e. a higher value for α) raises 
d
.
11
Two important aspects of the labor-demand elasticity are the time horizon and the aggregation
level to which the elasticity applies. As regards the time horizon, other production factors may respond
to changes in wage costs, especially in the longer run. The long-run wage elasticity of labor demand
is therefore likely to exceed the corresponding short-run elasticity. As regards the aggregation level,
the labor-demand elasticity on a macroeconomic level is likely to be smaller than on a sectoral or
microeconomic level.
12
Another reason for investigating the impact of changes in productivity is that modern economies
experience steady growth in labor productivity while the rate of unemployment remains more or less
stationary. In the face of this empirical observation, most models impose conditions that ensure that
changes in labour productivity do not impact unemployment. Sub-section 3.2 develops models in which,
in contrast to productivity, the tax burden does affect the structural rate of unemployment.
10
l = −
[
d/
(
u + d
)] [
ctm + ita + u
(
tl − a+ tc
)]
=
[
d/
(
u + d
)]
[cs+ u (a− t)]
(3)
w + tl − a =
[
u(t− a)− cs)/(u + d)
]
(4)
w − ta − pc =
[
d(a− t)− cs
]
/(u + d) (5)
where s = ta − tm, t ≡ ta + tl + tc, and the labor-demand elasticity d applies to the
macroeconomic level.
3.1.1 tax progression and overall tax burden
We consider the impact of three exogenous policy shocks, namely (i) a higher marginal
tax rate ceteris paribus the average tax wedge (i.e. tm = −s > 0; t = 0); (ii) a higher
average tax wedge ceteris paribus the marginal tax rate (i.e. t = ta = s > 0; tm = 0);
and (iii) a higher average tax wedge ceteris paribus the coefficient of residual income
progression (i.e. t = tm > 0; s = 0). The average tax wedge between the producer wage
and the consumer wage consists of the sum of the employees’ tax rate, employers’ tax
rate and consumer tax rate.13
The first two shocks are driven by labor-supply effects (compare the impact of tm
and ta in (1) and (3)). As described above, the marginal average and average tax rates
shift the labor supply curve down and up, respectively. How the impact is distributed
over employment and wage responses depends on the labor-demand elasticity. If this
latter elasticity is large (in absolute value), employment moves substantially while wages
do not change much. In any case, a higher marginal tax rate associated with a more
progressive tax system harms employment. Under a linear tax system, therefore, cutting
the marginal tax rate, while at the same time lowering tax allowances or the tax credit
in order to keep the average tax rate on labor income unaffected, enhances labor market
participation. The incentive mechanism operates entirely through the substitution effect
in labor supply. Raising the average tax rate on labor for a given marginal tax rate (e.g.,
by reducing tax allowances) depresses wage costs and boosts employment as i < 0. This
shock is transmitted entirely through the income effect in labor supply.
13
In analyzing these policy changes, we do not explicitly consider the government budget constraint.
The analysis implicitly assumes that changes in government revenues are transmitted into corresponding
changes in government spending that is separable from other arguments in the utility function in
households. Hence, the changes in government spending produced by public revenue effects do not
affect private decisions.
11
We now turn to the impact of a higher average tax wedge (i.e. t > 0) while
leaving the tax structure in terms of the degree of progressivity unaffected (i.e. s = 0).
If the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is positive, a larger tax burden
on labor income (t > 0) is partially shifted onto firms by raising the producer wage.
Workers are particularly successful in doing so if labor supply is rather elastic and
labor demand relatively inelastic. A higher average tax wedge between the producer
and consumer wage lowers employment and raises the producer wage if the substitution
effect dominates the income effect in labor supply (i.e. σ > 1 so that c > −i), i.e.
if the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply is positive (i.e. u > 0).14 If the
uncompensated labor-supply curve bends backwards, however, employment rises as the
producer wage declines. In this case, workers bear more than 100 percent of the tax
burden.
Unemployment benefits do not have a natural place in this equilibrium model of
the labor market. However, if one is willing to interpret unemployment as leisure, one
can model unemployment benefits as a subsidy to leisure (see Pissarides (1998) and van
der Ploeg (2003)). Unemployment benefits hurt labor supply through both substitution
and income effects. Indeed, unemployment benefits raise the effective marginal tax on
work while reducing the overall average tax rate.15
3.1.2 composition of tax burden
All components of the average tax wedge exert the same impact on employment. The
reason is that flexible wages ensure that firms can partially shift a higher payroll tax
(i.e. tl > 0) onto workers through lower wages, while higher wages allow workers to
shift higher income taxes and consumption taxes (i.e. ta, tc > 0) onto employers. This
equivalence of various taxes depends on flexible wages. If market wagesW were rigid, in
contrast to income and consumption taxes, payroll taxes would hurt employment. In the
presence of a fixed binding statutory minimum wage, therefore, replacing payroll taxes
by income taxes boosts employment. Such a tax reform in effect undoes some of the
implicit labor tax that workers impose on employers as a result of the minimum wage.
Why the same employment effect cannot be achieved by simply lowering the implicit tax
14
Empirical evidence suggests that this elasticity is indeed positive, being quite small for men (see
also section 5).
15
The latter effect on the average tax rate drops out if one imposes government budget balance with
exogenous public spending on other purposes besides unemployment benefits. In that case, higher tax
rates required to finance the additional benefits may further raise effective marginal tax rates.
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by reducing the minimum wage directly is unclear. Indeed, if the statutory minimum
wage is raised to protect the purchasing power of workers after raising the income tax
to replace the payroll tax, the tax reform does not succeed in raising employment.
An adverse productivity shock (a < 0) yields exactly the same effects as a rise in the
payroll tax rate, namely a drop in after-tax wages and a fall in (boost to) employment if
the substitution effect dominates (is outweighed by) the income effect in labor supply.16
Hence, an adverse supply shock amounts to an implicit labor tax. To keep employment
constant in the face of a steady increase in productivity, one needs to impose a unitary
elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption of goods (King, Plosser and
Rebelo, 1998). In that case, not only productivity shocks but also changes in the average
tax rate leave employment unaffected.17
3.1.3 human capital
Labor taxes impact not only the quantity of labor (i.e. hours worked) but also the
quality of labor (i.e. effort and human capital).18 With exogenous labor supply, propor-
tional labor taxes do not affect human capital accumulation if all costs of training are
deductible against the proportional tax rate. Intuitively, just as cash-flow taxes leave
capital investment unaffected,19 proportional labor taxes affect the costs and benefits
of investments in human capital in the same way. The neutrality of proportional labor
taxes no longer holds if hours worked is endogenous. At lower hours worked, human
capital accumulation becomes less attractive because human capital is utilized less inten-
sively. This so-called utilization effect makes schooling and labor supply complementary
activities.20
16
If other production factors besides labor enter the production function, labor productivity may
decline as a result of higher taxes on either these factors or (depending on the degree of complementarity
between labor and these factors) labor itself.
17
Alternatively, one could assume that A increases productivity not only of labor in the formal sector
but also the productivity of leisure time (see, e.g. Heckman (1976)). In that case, one does not have to
impose σ = 1 to reconcile productivity growth with a constant employment level. Hence, in contrast
to productivity changes, proportional taxes may affect employment.
18
Human capital is another channel through which tax policy may affect long-run productivity
growth. In fact, in endogenous growth models in which human capital drives growth (see e.g. Lu-
cas (1988)), labor taxes may exert permanent effects on growth.
19
In the presence of uncertain returns, proportional taxes may boost investments in human capital
by risk-averse agents. Indeed, in the presence of such a tax, the government in effect shares in the risk
of the investment. For the role of taxes as an insurance device, see Eaton and Rosen (1980).
20
Jacobs (2002) demonstrates that positive feedback effects between human capital and labor supply
raise the long-run wage elasticity of effective labor supply above the corresponding standard elasticities
13
This indirect complementarity is further strengthened in learning-by-doing models
(see Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002)). In these models, learning and working are
directly complementary, whereas in the traditional learning-or-doing model work and
schooling compete for a worker’s time. Nevertheless, if the labor market appropriately
prices the benefits from learning-by-doing in wages21, the implications of learning-by-
doing turn out to be equivalent to those of learning or doing. In any case, with en-
dogenous leisure, both models predict that permanent tax policies that stimulate labor
supply also boost human capital accumulation. At the same time, policies that encour-
age schooling increase long-run labor supply. Labor supply and human capital thus
exert positive feedback effects on each other.
Apart from the utilization and learning-by-doing effects, labor taxes may harm
human capital if not all costs of schooling are tax deductible (see, e.g. Trostel (1993)).
Similarly, if marginal taxes rise with income, benefits of schooling may be taxed at
higher rates than the rates against which costs are tax deductible, thereby discouraging
human capital accumulation (see Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997)). Residence-based
taxes on capital income, in contrast, stimulate schooling because they encourage agents
to substitute human capital for financial capital. These taxes can therefore help to offset
the human-capital distortions due to non-deductible training costs or rising marginal tax
rates (see Nielsen and Sørensen (1998)). Alternatively, training subsidies or compulsory
schooling may be employed to alleviate the adverse effect of progressive labor taxes on
human capital accumulation (see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2002)).
3.2 Equilibrium unemployment
Turning to the analysis of labor taxes in imperfect labor markets, we enter the realm
of second-best economics. Distortionary labor taxes may either alleviate or exacerbate
non-tax distortions in the labor market that give rise to involuntary unemployment.
Whereas the previous sub-section considered only a representative agent and did not
address distributional issues at all, this sub-section investigates the separate impacts of
that assume exogenous levels of human capital. If the government optimally employs schooling subsidies
to undo the effect of taxation on schooling, effective elasticities again correspond to the standard
elasticities. The utililization effects depends on human capital being more productive in work time
than leisure time. Heckman (1976), in contrast, assumes that human capital is equally productive in
leisure and work.
21
Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa (2002), however, seriously doubt whether firms can differentiate
wages on the basis expected future human capital benefits of current work. Indeed, they cite empirical
evidence for the learning-by-doing model (without sufficient wage discrimination).
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taxes on employed and unemployed agents. Workers, however, are still homogeneous.22
3.2.1 right-to-manage model
To illustrate the impact of taxes in imperfect labor markets, we formulate a right-to-
manage model of the labor market.23 Many symmetric decentralized unions exert market
power in a labor-market segment but are too small to internalize the effects of higher
wages on prices, profits and the government budget constraint. Unions and employers
bargain about wages, after which firms set employment.
Union preferences are characterized by the following objective function24
Lv(W a) + (N − L)WU r ; v′(W a) > 0, v”(W a) ≤ 0, (6)
where N denotes the number of trade union members of which L are employed. W a ≡
W − T (W ) represents after-tax wages earned in the industry, where W and T (W )
represent the market wage and the personal income tax function respectively. A concave
felicity function v(W a) implies risk-averse workers. In several cases, we will assume that
felicity is isoelastic, i.e. v(W a) = (W a)1−ρ/(1 − ρ), where ρ stands for the (constant)
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In wage bargaining, the union takes the outside option (i.e. expected utility out-
side the industry Ur) as given and accounts for labor-demand behavior by firms which
is modelled along the lines of sub-section 3.1. The perceived wage elasticity of labor
demand d depends on the price elasticity of demand for the bargaining unit as a whole
(i.e. the industry). This price elasticity is likely to be smaller than the price elastic-
ity facing an individual firm. Nash bargaining maximizes [L(v(W a)− Ur)]βΠ1−β with
respect to W, where profits Π are given by P
y
(AF (L))AF (L)− (1+T l)WL. This yields
v(W a)− Ur
v(W a)
= Sm, (7)
22
For a more complete distributional analysis, see section 5, which introduces heterogeneous workers.
23
The effects of labor taxes on wages and unemployment are very similar in efficiency wage models
and search models, although the normative implications for welfare may be different. See Bovenberg
and van der Ploeg (1994), Sørensen (1997), and Pissarides (1998).
24
The objective function can be interpreted as an expected utility function of union members. (6)
assumes that hours worked in a full-time job are exogenously fixed. For a model in which unions also
set hours worked in a full-time job, see Sørensen (1997). Alternatively, employed individual workers can
determine working time after wages have been set. For this formulation of endogenous individual labor
supply within a bargaining framework, see Kilponen and Sinko (2003) for a monopoly union model,
and Holmlund (2000) for individual bargaining with home production.
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wherem ≡
v
′
(W
a
)W
a
v(W
a
)
[
d
+
1−β
β
(1+T
l
)WL
Π
]
. The union sets utility in work as a mark up on outside utility
U r.25 A more progressive tax system, which implies a lower coefficient of residual income
progression S, moderates wages. Intuitively, a high marginal tax rate implies that higher
wages accrue mainly to the government rather than union members. Hence, from the
union’s point of view, the pay off from higher wage costs (and the associated loss in
employment) in terms of higher net incomes for working members is only low so that
the union moderates wages. By affecting wage setting behavior, a more progressive tax
system for workers thus combats inequality between employed union members enjoying
utility v(W a) and union members who only obtain outside utility U r.
Apart from S, however, tax policy cannot affect this inequity as measured by the
ratio v(W a)/ U r. In particular, unions undo the effect on v(W a)/ U r of a higher tax
on union members employed in the sector by raising the before-tax reward to work, W,
so that v(W a)/ U r does not decline. In this way, union behavior limits the scope for
redistribution between workers and the unemployed.26
Various non-tax factors affect the mark-up m. To explore these factors, we assume
that other production factors besides labor are fixed. In that case, the mark-up can be
written as v
′
(W
a
)W
a
v(W
a
)
/
[
1
( 1−α
σ
f
+
α
ε
)
+ 1−β
β
α(1−
1
ε
)
[1−α(1−
1
ε
)]
]
.Wages are thus moderated if bargaining
firms as a unit do not yield much market power on the commodity market (i.e.1
ε
is small),
labor is a good substitute for the fixed factor (i.e. σf is large), profits account only for
a small share of value added (i.e. α is large), and unions do not exert much bargaining
power (i.e. β is small).27 The first two conditions ensure that the (quasi-)rents parties
bargain over are only small.
In order to solve for wages in general equilibrium in which outside utility U r is
endogenous, we use the following expression for outside utility
U r = g(u)[v(B) + δ] + (1− g(u))v(W¯ a), (8)
where B and W¯ a denote the unemployment benefit and after-tax wages of workers
employed in other sectors, respectively, and δ ≥ 0 is the utility of leisure if unemployed.28
25
An efficiency wage model in which effort by workers, e, is given by e = (W
a
−W
r
)
ζ
and firms set
wages to maximize profits yields a similar expression for the wage mark-up, except that the mark-up
m is replaced by the exponent ζ in the effort function.
26
The same holds true in an efficiency wage model; see Stiglitz (1999).
27
In case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, a fixed price elasticity ε, an isoelastic utility function
v(C) = C
1−ρ
, and a fixed S, this mark-up is constant and given by
S(1−ρ)[1−α(1−
1
ε
)]
1+
1−β
β
α(1−
1
ε
)
. Hence, more risk
aversion (i.e. a higher value for ρ) moderates wages.
28
With an isoelastic utility function v(C) = C
1−ρ
, one can interpret the coefficient of risk aversion
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(1 − g(u)), measures the probability of finding a job outside the current sector. This
probability is decreasing with the aggregate unemployment rate (i.e. dg/du > 0). In a
symmetric equilibrium, all unions set the same wages, so that W¯ a = W a. Using this
equilibrium condition in (8) to eliminate W¯ a and using the result in (7) to eliminate Ur,
we arrive at the following expression for equilibrium unemployment u :
g(u) =
Sm
[1− (v(B) + δ)/v(W a))
. (9)
This expression can be interpreted as the wage-setting curve. Together with the
labor-demand function (2), the curve determines labor-market equilibrium. Thus, com-
pared to the competitive equilibrium analyzed in sub-section 3.1, the wage-setting curve
rather than the labor-supply curve affects actual wages. The labor-supply curve im-
plicit in the reservation wage is given by v(B) + δ. It is thus horizontal in (L,w) space,
reflecting an infinite elasticity of labor supply associated with constant utility of leisure
δ.
3.2.2 net replacement rate fixed
We first look at the special case in which the effective net (i.e. after-tax) replacement
rate R ≡ B/W a is fixed, utility is isoelastic, utility of leisure is absent (i.e. δ = 0),
and S and the mark-up m are fixed. In these circumstances, the wage curve determines
equilibrium unemployment
g(u) =
Sm
[1−R1−ρ]
.
The wage curve is vertical in (L,W ) space. Intuitively, an increase in the wage rate does
not make work more attractive because the fixed replacement implies that such a wage
increase is accompanied by an equivalent increase in the unemployment benefit B.
tax progression The tax system affects employment through the coefficient of resid-
ual income progression S. The employment impacts of a higher marginal tax rate (ceteris
paribus the average tax wedge, i.e. tm = −s > 0) and a higher average tax wedge (ce-
teris paribus the marginal tax rate, i.e. t = ta = s > 0) have the opposite sign as the
employment impacts established in sub-section 3.1. In particular, whereas sub-section
3.1 showed that a higher marginal tax rate hurts employment by harming labor supply,
ρ also as the reciprocal of the substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure. A lower substi-
tution elasticity makes unemployment less attractive and thus moderates wages. In principle, δ can be
negative if the unemployed are stigmatized.
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we now find that it actually boosts employment by moderating wages.29 Indeed, in our
second-best setting, a high marginal tax rate alleviates the distortions implied by the
market power of unions.
overall tax burden Given a fixed effective replacement rate R = B/W a, a higher
average tax wedge (ceteris paribus the coefficient of residual income progression, i.e.
t = tm > 0; s = 0) leaves equilibrium unemployment unaffected. Raising the tax
burden while maintaining the structure of taxation (as measured by the coefficient of
residual income progression) thus does not impact labor-market transactions. Workers
completely accommodate the higher tax burden in terms of lower after-tax wages so that
wage costs (and hence labor demand) remain constant. This is known in the literature
as the complete absence of real wage resistance.
The intuition behind this lack of real wage resistance is that the unemployed are in
effect subject to the higher tax burden. With the outside option thus effectively being
taxed, the bargaining position of the union weakens so that wages are moderated. In-
deed, the key effective tax rate in this model is the effective (after-tax) replacement rate.
As long as the tax system does not affect this key variable, it leaves unemployment un-
affected. With a vertical wage-setting curve, also payroll taxes or capital taxes harming
labor productivity (thereby shifting the labor-demand curve) do not affect employment
but are transmitted fully as changes in market wages.
This result of lack of real wage resistance has been quite popular for both theoret-
ical and empirical reasons. Regarding the theoretical reasons, one would like to clearly
separate the unemployment impact of the tax burden and that of the social insurance
system (and the replacement rate). A higher tax burden affects equilibrium unemploy-
ment only through the channel of the effective (after-tax) replacement rate. Another
reason for the popularity of this result is that most labor-market models impose con-
ditions that ensure that productivity growth does not impact unemployment. Fixing
the replacement rate ensures that the models replicate this stylized fact. As regards
empirical reasons, several cross-country studies could not establish significant empiri-
cal correlation between average tax rates and unemployment (see e.g. Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991)). Indeed, as long as one measures the after-tax replacement rate
R = B/W a and the coefficient of residual income progression S correctly, one would not
expect to find an additional separate effect of the tax burden.
29
The wage moderating effects of high marginal tax rates have been established empirically by Lock-
wood and Manning (1993), Tyrvainen (1995), and Graafland and Huizinga (1999).
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composition of the tax burden Changes in the tax structure, i.e. replacing payroll
taxes by consumption taxes, do not affect equilibrium unemployment. A upward shift in
the labor-demand curve as a consequence of lower payroll taxes results in higher wages.
This protects the purchasing power of workers and benefit recipients after the increase
in consumption taxes.
3.2.3 gross replacement rate fixed
Daveri and Tabellini (2000) have challenged the result that a higher tax burden does
not affect unemployment, which has been supported by empirical studies that could not
find any significant correlation between cross-section variations in unemployment and
tax rates. They argue that labor-market institutions differ significantly across countries
and that fixed effects thus dominate cross-sectional variations in unemployment rates.
Accordingly, they rely on time-series instead of cross-section evidence to establish the
link between the labor tax burden and unemployment. They find that time variation
in labor taxes tends to be strongly correlated with unemployment changes in highly
unionized countries of continental Europe. The correlation is substantially less strong,
however, in the Scandinavian countries with centralized trade unions. Hence, the un-
employment impact of labor taxes depends importantly on the non-tax institutions of a
country.
To establish real wage resistance theoretically, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) assume
that the replacement rate is fixed in before-tax terms and that unemployment benefits
are not subject to income tax.30 With isoelastic utility but without leisure (i.e. δ = 0),
equilibrium employment amounts to
g(u) =
Sm
[1− (Rg/(1− T a))1−ρ]
, (10)
where Rg = B/W is the fixed gross (i.e. before-personal tax) replacement rate.
overall tax burden At fixed S, a higher average tax burden T a raises unemployment
by in effect increasing the net replacement rate Rg/(1−T a), thereby making unemploy-
30
Similar results would be found if the unemployment benefits were taxed but at a lower average rate
¯
T
a
than wages and if the coefficient (1−
¯
T
a
)/(1− T
a
) would increase with the tax burden. If the tax
schedule features a constant coefficient of residual income progression S and unemployment benefits
would be subject to the same income tax schedule, the coefficient (1 −
¯
T
a
)/(1 − T
a
) would not vary
with the overall tax burden but would depend only on S. Indeed, as shown below in (11), equilibrium
unemployment is given by g(u) =
Sm
1−(R
g
)
S
, where R
g
= B/W stands for the fixed replacement rate in
before-tax terms.
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ment relatively more attractive. Union members pay for the higher tax burden less in
terms of lower after-tax wages, and more in terms of a higher probability of becoming
unemployed. The intuition behind the higher unemployment rate can be understood as
follows. (7) implies that the utility of non-employed union members is proportional to
employed union members. Hence, a higher tax burden raising the net replacement rate
does not make non-employed union members better off compared to employed mem-
bers. The effect of a higher net replacement rate is offset by a higher unemployment
rate increasing the expected duration of unemployment. Indeed, a change in the net
replacement rate is powerless to affect the relative position of the unemployed compared
to the employed.
Whether the higher tax burden makes the employed and the unemployed worse
off depends on the elasticity of labor demand.31 With inelastic labor demand, a higher
tax burden may even raise after-tax wages so that workers can shift more than 100 % of
the tax burden unto employers. The intuition for the overshifting is that higher wages
increase unemployment benefits, thereby improving the outside option and thus increas-
ing wage pressure. If at the same time labor demand is inelastic, the higher wages do
not result in much additional unemployment, so that wage pressures remain.32 Indeed,
with inelastic labor demand, workers are able to shift the tax burden onto profits, con-
sumers and other taxpayers. With overshifting, despite the higher unemployment rate
increasing the expected duration of unemployment, also the unemployed in effect gain
because higher wages raise income not only in employment but also in unemployment
(since unemployment benefits are linked to wages).
One way to justify the separate unemployment effect of T a in empirical wage
equations (even if they directly measure S and the after-tax replacement rates from social
insurance benefits) is that, in addition to taxed unemployment benefits, unemployed
may derive untaxed incomes from the informal sector (see Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1998) and Holmlund (2000)) or enjoy utility of untaxed leisure (see Sørensen (1997)).
The official replacement rates, which include only public unemployment benefits, thus
do not correctly measure the effective replacement rates. Indeed, with a fixed net
replacement rate from unemployment insurance R, isoelastic utility and positive non-
31
Similar conditions determine the distributional effects of a higher replacement rate R
g
. Note that the
(absolute value of the) elasticity of labor demand is likely to increase with the time horizon considered.
In particular, the long-term labor elasticity is likely to exceed the labor-demand elasticity that the
union employs to estimate the employment impact of higher wage costs.
32
With higher wages raising unemployment benefits and profits, the negative external effects on the
government budget and profits become more substantial.
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taxed other income in unemployment δ, the wage-setting curve is given by (from (9))
g(u) =
Sm
[1−R1−ρ − δ/(W (1− T a)1−ρ]
.
With non-taxed sources of unemployment income, productivity growth is consistent
with stationary unemployment if non-taxed incomes rise with productivity in the formal
economy so that δ∗ ≡ δ/W is fixed. In that case, the wage-setting curve is vertical again.
With a fixed net official replacement rate R, in contrast to the situation without non-
tax sources of unemployment income, an increase in the average tax burden T a moves
this vertical curve to the right.33 Hence, conditions that ensure that changes in labor
productivity do not impact unemployment do not necessarily imply that a higher tax
burden leaves unemployment unaffected.
The result that the tax burden raises the equilibrium unemployment rate is an
important, and controversial policy conclusion. In the Netherlands, for example, the
empirical result that — even if one controls for the official replacement rate — the tax
wedge significantly affects equilibrium unemployment has been quite robust (see, e.g.
Graafland and Huizinga (1999)). It has played an important role in supporting policies
to contain the tax burden. Indeed, the numerical impacts of a lower tax wedge can be
substantial. To illustrate, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find that the rise of 10 percentage
points in the rate of effective labor tax in continental Europe in the seventies and eighties
can explain about 3 percentage points of the increase in European unemployment during
this period. Nickell and Layard (1999) estimate an unemployment effect of about 2
percentage points of such a tax increase.34
tax progression Tax progression raises the net replacement rate if unemployment
benefits are subject to the same tax schedule as wage income, while the replacement rate
is fixed in before-tax terms. This is in fact the case in many OECD countries (see OECD
(2002b)). In that case, more progression exerts two offsetting effects in equilibrium
unemployment. In addition to moderating wages, it boosts wages by raising the net
replacement rate. To illustrate these two effects, we assume a tax schedule featuring a
constant coefficient of residual income progression S. In particular, the tax schedule is
given by T (Y ) = Y −gY S, where g and S are positive constants and Y is gross (labor or
33
Also an increase in the consumption tax moves this curve to the right is the price of output in the
formal sector is proportional to consumer prices.
34
The macro-economic model of CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis implies that
rise in the tax wedge of one percentage point reduces equilibrium unemployment effect by about 1/4
percentage point.
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unemployment) income. This tax schedule implies that the coefficient of residual income
progression is fixed at S. With this tax schedule, equilibrium unemployment amounts
to
g(u) =
Sm
1− (Rg)S
, (11)
where Rg denotes the fixed replacement rate (in before-tax terms).35 In that case, the
wage moderation effect of more progression still dominates the replacement rate effect.
Accordingly, more progression alleviates unemployment, even if high gross replacement
rates imply that more progression raises effective net replacement substantially.36 Re-
placing a proportional consumption tax by a progressive income tax thus boosts em-
ployment.
This result is modified if we allow for positive income from leisure δ. In that case,
a more progressive tax schedule may actually raise equilibrium unemployment. Intu-
itively, with high leisure, the replacement rate effect becomes relatively more important
compared to the wage-moderation effect. At high replacement rates, a progressive tax
system thus becomes less powerful in boosting employment. Indeed, a more progressive
tax schedule raises unemployment if non-taxable income δ∗ = δ/W (1 − T a) and the
gross replacement rate Rg are large while the tax system is quite progressive to start
with (i.e. S is small). All these three factors contribute to a high net replacement rate.
Starting from a proportional income tax system, the introduction of some progres-
sion may help to fight unemployment. At higher levels of progression, however, further
increasing progression may be counterproductive in terms of the objective of reduc-
ing unemployment. There is thus a level of progression that minimizes unemployment
35
Note that a higher average tax burden raising the parameter g does not impact unemployment.
Hence, a higher tax burden does not affect unemployment even if, as documented by Daveri and
Tabellini (2000), the unemployed pay less taxes than the employed do. Hence, just as in the case with a
fixed after-tax replacement rate (see sub-section 3.2.2), the average tax rate does not affect equilibrium
unemployment.
36
The unemployment effect of more progression (with a fixed gross effective replacement rate) is
very similar to that of more risk aversion (with a fixed net effective replacement rate). To determine
these effects, one takes the derivative of the function f(a) = a/(1 − b
a
) with respect a. The sign of
this derivative is determined by 1 − b
a
(1 − a log b). This expression is non-negative because g(a, b) ≡
b
a
(1− a log b) ≤ 1. This inequity can be established by showing that δg/δa and δg/δb are both positive
for a > 0 and 0 < b < 1 so that g(a, b) reaches a maximum of 1 at a = 1 and b = 1 (we impose the
restriction a ≤ 1, b ≤ 1).
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defined by the following implicit equation for S 37
1− δ∗ = (Rg)α(1− α logRg).
The optimal tax system is progressive (i.e. α < 1) as long as the gross replacement rate
and utility from leisure δ∗ are not very large, so that (Rg)(1− logRg) < 1− δ∗.
This example suggests that the unemployment impacts of taxes and unemploy-
ment benefits are related. If tax systems are progressive, a given gross replacement
rate implies a higher after-tax replacement rate, so that this replacement rate worsens
unemployment more. At the same time, at higher replacement rates, changes in pro-
gression are less likely to reduce unemployment, as the replacement rate effect of more
progression becomes stronger compared to the wage-moderating effect.
composition of the tax burden The differential impacts of productivity and explicit
labor taxes generate scope for tax policies to boost employment. In particular, replacing
explicit labor taxes by implicit labor taxes boosts employment. Intuitively, such a
tax switch in effect reduces the net replacement rate and shifts the tax burden onto
non-labor income. With their non-taxed incomes being tied to before-tax wages, the
unemployed bear the burden of the implicit labor taxes (since these taxes reduce before-
tax wages), yet escape the burden of explicit labor taxes. Hence, this tax reform succeeds
in shifting the tax burden towards the unemployed so that the outside option becomes
less attractive. This stimulates wage moderation and thus employment.
Implicit labor taxes can take various forms. Source-based capital income taxes in
small open economies are one example. With mobile capital, these taxes are shifted onto
labor (and with unemployment benefits and other non-labor income δ being linked to
wages also onto the unemployed) in the form of lower labor productivity. Environmental
taxes on tradable intermediate inputs such as energy are another example. Indeed,
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) and Koskela and Schob (1999) show that green
37
Here we assume that δ is proportional to gross wages W, while T
a
is constant. We thus vary
progression at a constant average tax burden on workers. The expression is found by taking the
first derivative of g(u) = α/(1 − δ
∗
− (R
g
)
α
) with respect to α. The sign of this derivative depends
on h(R
g
, α) ≡ 1 − δ
∗
− (R
g
)
α
(1 − α logR
g
). This function is decreasing in R
g
and increasing in α.
Since we have h(R
g
, 0) = −δ, h(R
g
, 1) > 0 (i.e. (R
g
)(1 − logR
g
) < 1 − δ) is a sufficient condition
for the existence of a unique optimal value for 0 < α < 1 if δ
∗
> 0. At this unique value of α, we
have 1 − δ
∗
− (R
g
)
α
= −α(R
g
)
α
logR
g
> 0 if R
g
< 1. Hence, at the optimal value of α, g(u) =
α/(1− δ
∗
− (R
g
)
α
) is well defined (as the denominator is positive). Note that the optimal marginal tax
rate is 100 % (i.e. α = 0) if δ
∗
= 0 or R
g
= 0.
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tax reforms may boost employment if they succeed in shifting the tax burden to non-
labor income and income of the unemployed, in particular. If they succeed in increasing
employment, these reforms are thus an indirect way to cut the effective net replacement
rate. These conclusions are consistent with Bovenberg (1995), who argues that a green
tax reform boosts employment only if the tax burden is shifted away from workers
to people outside the active labor force (e.g. pensioners, owners of natural resources,
transfer recipients).
Whether replacing income taxes by consumption taxes or payroll taxes succeeds in
alleviating unemployment depends on how income in unemployment δ responds to higher
consumption taxation. If goods produced in the informal sector are perfect substitutes
for goods supplied by the formal sector, non- labor income δ is proportional to consumer
prices P c = (1 + T c) and labor productivity in the formal sector W (1 + T l). With a
fixed net official replacement rate R, equilibrium unemployment is given by38
g(u) =
Sm
{1− [R + δ∗(1 + T c)(1 + T l)/((1− T a)]1−ρ}
,
where δ∗ is fixed. Hence, all components of the explicit tax wedge exert the same impact
on equilibrium unemployment. A change in the explicit tax structure will thus not help
to boost employment.39
The situation is different if unemployment benefits are linked to market wages
and are subject to consumption tax but not to personal income tax.40 Equilibrium
unemployment is now given by
g(u) =
Sm
{1− [R/(1− T a) + δ∗(1 + T c)(1 + T l)/((1− T a)]1−ρ}
Substituting payroll or consumption taxes for personal income taxes cuts unemployment.
The reason is that the unemployed pay the payroll tax (through the link to market wages)
and the consumption tax but escape the personal income tax.41
38
Here we have assume that all income from the informal sector is spent on consumption. In other
words, saving is zero.
39
Note that substituting implicit taxes (which reduce labor productivity) for explicit taxes still cuts
unemployment. Indeed, implicit taxes leave the proportionality factor δ
∗
and thus unemployment
unaffected. Explicit taxes, in contrast, raise unemployment. The intuition for the difference between
explicit and implicit taxes is that only implicit taxes bear on the income of the unemployed and thus
the outside option in wage bargaining.
40
This, in fact, the case considered by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). They document that unemploy-
ment benefits enjoy partial or full exemptions from income taxation or social security contributions.
41
In the same vein, whether employers or employees pay social security contributions may thus affect
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The role of the bargaining level The employment effect of labor taxes depends
crucially on wage-setting institutions (see also Daveri and Tabellini (2000)). Up to now,
we have assumed decentralized wage setting. Some countries, however, feature more
centralized wage setting. Centralized unions may internalize the adverse impacts of
high unemployment on the government budget constraint, thereby moderating wages
(see Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Summers, Gruber and Vergara (1993)).42 In fact,
taxes may no longer affect unemployment at all. Intuitively, unions see through the veil
of the government budget constraint and offset changes in the tax rate through transfers
that exactly offset the real effects of taxes. This is a mixed blessing. The good news
is that a higher average tax burden is less harmful for employment if (part of) income
in unemployment is untaxed.43 The bad news is, however, that a high marginal tax
rate becomes less effective in reducing the monopoly distortion. This latter distortionis
absent, however, if unions also internalize the impact of wages on profits (e.g. because
union members derive their pensions from shareholdings in the firms) and consumer
prices (because union members consume the commodities produced at home). Indeed,
unions may internalize the effect of high wages on not only the government budget
constraint but also on profits and prices.44
In addition to centralization, another important aspect of wage-setting institutions
is the time horizon unions consider in setting wages. In particular, if they have a short-
term horizon, unions can take the capital stock as given. Hence, the labor-demand
elasticity in wage bargaining is rather low, implying a relatively high wage mark-up m
and thus a high equilibrium unemployment rate. If reputational considerations allow
unions to commit, in contrast, unions use a longer time horizon in considering the effects
of high wages. Hence, they in effect employ larger labor-demand elasticity in setting
unemployment. In particular, if benefit recipients are exempt from paying social security taxes and
benefits are indexed to market wages, in contrast to employers’ social security contributions, employees’
social security contributions raise unemployment.
42
This explains why smaller European countries feature lower unemployment rates than larger ones.
An alternative explanation, however, is that small countries features less market power on commodity
markets (i.e. ε
d
and ε are larger) so that the union mark-up m in (9) is smaller.
43
Indeed, Nickell and Layard (1999, pp. 3059) find empirical evidence that coordination in wage
bargaining reduces the impact of taxes on equilibrium unemployment. If unions also set working hours
(as in Sørensen (1997) for example), taxes also leave labor supply unaffected if unions internalize the
government budget constraint. Hence, in contrast to the competitive model with endogenous labor
supply (see sub-section 3.1), taxes are non distortionary.
44
Indeed, if all budget constraints are linked through one representative agent, policy becomes com-
pletely neutral (see Bernheim and Bagwell (1988)).
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wages. With a smaller union mark-up, changes in labor taxes exert a smaller impact on
unemployment.45
3.2.4 unemployment benefits linked to consumer prices
Unemployment benefits may be linked to (producer or consumer) prices rather than (net
or gross) wages, especially in the short run.46 Indeed, these benefits may be associated
with an exogenous minimum income a country wants to maintain to keep liquidity-
constrained households above the poverty line. In this case, the wage-setting curve is no
longer vertical but slopes upward. Intuitively, higher wages are no longer transmitted
into higher income during unemployment. This makes a higher wage more effective in
equilibrating the labor market. In particular, a higher wage makes work more attractive
compared to unemployment, thereby boosting employment.
If unemployment benefits are linked to consumer prices and are thus fixed in real
terms, the wage-setting curve describing the target real wage (in terms of producer
prices) is given by (from (9))
v(W (1− T a)/(1 + T c)) = [v(B) + δ]
[
1−
Sm
g(u)
]
−1
.
overall tax burden At a given coefficient of residual income progression, all compo-
nents of the overall tax wedge exert the same negative impact on employment. Higher
consumption and income taxes shift the wage setting curve upwards, while higher payroll
taxes and implicit labor taxes (which harm labor productivity) shift the labor-demand
curve downwards. Intuitively, all taxes are paid only by workers, while the unemployed
are protected. Hence, higher taxes make work less attractive compared to unemploy-
ment. There is thus real wage resistance in that after-tax wages do not fully absorb a
higher tax burden.
How much wage costs increase and after-tax wages decline in response to a higher
tax burden depends on the slopes of the labor-demand and wage-setting curves. Workers
shift most of the tax burden onto firms if labor demand is inelastic (i.e. horizontal in
(L,W ) space) and unemployment does not affect the target real wage much, so that the
wage-setting curve is vertical in (L,W ) space. In that case, employed union members
45
For commitment problems facing unions, see van der Ploeg (1987). In a small open economy with
mobile capital, the long-run wage elasticity of labor demand may become very large. This explains why
smaller European countries feature lower unemployment rates than larger European countries.
46
If this link would be maintained in the long run, productivity growth reduces the replacement rate
so that unemployment declines over time.
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and non-employed union members do not experience much of a loss in utility. Utility of
non-employed union members, U r, does not decline much, as unemployment does not
increase substantially. The initial decrease in inequity between workers and unemployed
is thus restored mainly through an increase in W a. The other extreme case involves
elastic labor demand and elastic wage setting (with respect to unemployment). In this
case, the initial gap between utilities of workers and unemployed agents is re-established
through higher unemployment reducing U r rather than through higher market wages
increasing W a.
composition of the tax burden Just as in the case in which the after-tax replace-
ment rate is fixed, all components of the tax burden exert exactly the same effect on
after-tax wages, wage costs and employment. Whereas under a fixed net replacement
rate the unemployed (i.e. the outside option) share in all components of the tax burden,
they escape the tax burden if unemployment benefits are fixed in real terms.
tax progression A more progressive personal income tax (i.e. a lower level for S)
shifts the wage-setting curve downwards and thus boosts employment, especially if labor
demand is elastic.
3.2.5 unemployment benefits linked to producer prices
Unemployment benefits may also be indexed to producer prices. Indeed, if productivity
in the informal sector is largely independent of that in the formal sector, indexation to
producer prices (and benefits not subject to income tax) captures the case of activities in
the informal sector. In this case, just as the employed, the unemployed pay consumption
taxes and the wage-setting curve is given by (with isoelastic utility and δ = 0)
[W (1− T a)]1−ρ = B1−ρ
[
1−
Sm
g(u)
]
−1
.
overall tax burden Since the consumption tax does not the affect the net replacement
rate, it affects neither the wage-setting curve nor the labor-demand curve and thus does
not impact equilibrium unemployment. The effect of higher consumption taxes is thus
the same as in the case in which the after-tax replacement rate is fixed. Accordingly, a
higher consumption tax is completely absorbed by workers (and unemployed) in terms of
a lower after-tax income. In contrast to the consumption tax, personal income, payroll
and implicit taxes are escaped by the unemployed. These latter taxes bear only on
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workers, who shift them onto firms in terms of higher wage costs, thereby harming
employment.
composition of the tax burden In contrast to consumption taxes, other taxes exert
differential direct effects on workers and the unemployed. This difference in the differ-
ential effects creates scope for revenue-neutral tax reforms to boost unemployment. In
particular, replacing the payroll tax, the income tax or implicit labor taxes by an in-
direct tax on consumption raises employment by shifting the tax burden towards the
unemployed (i.e. imposing a larger burden on the outside option of unions). Whereas
replacing consumption taxes by implicit taxes boosts employment if unemployment ben-
efits are linked to gross wages W (1 + T l), such a tax reform hurts employment if these
unemployment benefits are linked to producer prices. Accordingly, whether replacing im-
plicit taxes by consumption taxes raises or reduces employment thus crucially depends
on how unemployment benefits respond to prices and wages and how unemployment
benefits are taxed.
The effect of a higher personal income tax T a is the same as that of a consumption
tax if unemployment benefits are subject to the same tax rate T a. In that case, the
wage-setting curve is given by (with isoelastic utility and δ = 0)
W 1−ρ = B1−ρ
[
1−
Sm
g(u)
]
−1
.
Also a higher personal income tax now leaves the equilibrium unemployment rate
unaffected since both the unemployed and the employed share in the same additional
tax burden. In that case, replacing payroll taxes (or implicit taxes) by personal income
taxes boosts employment. Payroll taxes hurt employment not because they are paid by
employers but rather because they do not bear on the unemployed.
3.2.6 indexation of unemployment benefits: a review
This sub-section 3.2 has shown that the impact of tax policy on unemployment depend
crucially on the indexation and the tax treatment of unemployment benefits. To con-
clude this sub-section, we summarize how these crucial institutional arrangements affect
the impact of tax policy. In particular, benefits (net of income taxes) can be indexed
to consumer prices, producer prices, wages net of income tax, market wages, and gross
wages (see Table 5). With indexation of unemployment benefits to consumer prices,
the purchasing power of the unemployed is fixed in real terms. Hence, the unemployed
escape the burden of a higher tax burden. If benefits are indexed to after-tax wages,
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in contrast, the purchasing power of the unemployed rises in proportion to that of the
employed. Hence, the unemployed share with workers the tax burden on labor incomes.
Under the other indexation schemes, various taxes exert different impacts on the
unemployed. In these cases, a revenue-neutral tax reform can therefore impact equilib-
rium unemployment by affecting the real value of unemployment benefits. In particular,
if benefits are indexed to producer prices, the unemployed bear only the burden of taxes
on consumption. Accordingly, with indexation to producer prices, all taxes (including
an implicit tax on labor in the form of an adverse productivity shock) except the con-
sumer tax exert the same effects on after-tax benefits as with indexation to consumer
prices, i.e. they leave the after-tax value of unemployment benefits unaffected. In this
particular case, therefore, increasing the weight of consumption taxes in the tax mix
raises employment by making unemployment less attractive.
The unemployed bear only implicit taxes (i.e. adverse productivity shocks) if
benefits are indexed to the consumption value of gross wages. With benefit indexation
to market wages, the unemployed bear also the burden of consumer and payroll taxes.
Hence, all taxes except for the personal income tax reduce the purchasing power of
benefits in the same way as with indexation to after-tax wages; only the income tax
protects the purchasing power of the unemployed.
The indexation schemes assume that benefits are not subject to personal income
tax. Table 5 indicates how various taxes affect the after-tax income of the unemployed if
the government levies an income tax on benefits.47 In particular, if benefits are indexed
to producer prices, the unemployed suffer the burden of the income tax in addition to
that of consumer taxes. In that case, the unemployed escape the burden of only payroll
taxes and implicit taxes (i.e. adverse productivity shocks). If benefits are indexed to
market wages and are subject to income tax, the unemployed share in the burden of all
taxes, including that of the income tax. Hence, this case is equivalent to the case in
which benefits are untaxed and indexed to after-tax wages.
Table 5 includes the case in which benefits are tied to labor productivity (i.e.
wage costs). Under this regime (and if benefits are not included in the income tax
base), benefits can be interpreted as income from activities in the informal sector if
productivity developments in the informal sector are in line with those in the formal
47
We assume that benefits and labour incomes are subject to the same increase in the average rate
of income tax. If the income tax is progressive, the unemployed may suffer a smaller rise in the average
tax burden. In that case, the decline in the after-tax income of the unemployed is a weighted average of
the income developments in case benefits are exempt from income tax and in case benefits are subject
to the same rise in the average tax rate as labour income.
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sector. Income from these activities escapes income and payroll taxes and is taxed
only by a consumer tax when it is spent. Hence, only adverse productivity shocks
and consumer taxes reduce real incomes of the unemployed. Table 5 reveals that this
indexation regime is equivalent to indexation to market wages except for changes in the
payroll tax. If benefits are subject to income tax (see the second column of Table 5),
the unemployed bear the burden of productivity shocks as well as consumer and income
taxes and escape the burden of only the payroll tax.
The first column of Table 5 reveals that, compared to other taxes, the consumer
tax reduces the incomes of the unemployed in most (i.e. in four of the five) indexation
schemes if unemployment benefits are not included in the income tax base. Only if
benefits are indexed to consumer prices does this tax increase leave the unemployed
unaffected. The second column of Table 5 reveals that if benefits are subject to income
tax, the payroll tax is the tax that leaves unemployment incomes unaffected under most
(i.e. in the three of the five) indexation regimes. Only if benefits are indexed to after-tax
or market wages, does a payroll tax hurt the unemployed.
4 Optimal taxes: efficiency
4.1 Progressive taxation and efficiency
In a second-best world, progressive taxes may help to alleviate various imperfections.
The previous section considered one specific labor-market imperfection, namely monop-
sony power of unions. In the particular model we explored, a 100 % marginal tax rate
(i.e. S = 0) would be optimal to eliminate the mark-up of unions on the reservation
wage. High marginal tax rates may also help to combat leapfrogging of employers when
they set efficiency wages. To illustrate, if effort depends on relative wages (i.e. the wage
paid in a firm compared to the average wage level in the economy), employers impose
adverse externalities on other firms if they raise wages in order to stimulate effort of
their own workers. High marginal taxes on wage increases may help to internalize these
externalities.
Marginal labor taxes may internalize adverse externalities also if utility from con-
sumption depends in part on one’s relative position in society (see Layard (1980)). In
that case, an individual raising his consumption by working harder reduces the utility
of others. Marginal taxes help to combat these negative external effects of additional
consumption.
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In addition to labor-market imperfections, progressive tax systems may also help to
alleviate distortions on capital markets. In particular, poor agents and young agents may
suffer from liquidity constraints when they want to borrow in order to invest in human
capital or to smooth consumption over their lifecycle. Progressive taxes redistribute
income towards the poor and the young (since young workers tend to earn less than older
workers) and thus help to alleviate these capital-market imperfections (see Hubbard and
Judd (1986)).
Another relevant non-tax market failure concerns insurance markets. Parents can
not sign contracts insuring their children against career risks. Moreover, insurance
against various human capital risks suffers from adverse selection. Hence, private insur-
ance contracts are not available or are excessively expensive. Agents may thus demand
a high risk premium on their investments, which inhibits risk taking and entrepreneur-
ship (see Sinn (1995)). By helping to pool human capital risks, a progressive labor tax
helps to create the missing market for insurance of human capital (see Eaton and Rosen
(1980)). Indeed, from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. behind the veil of ignorance), a
redistributive labor tax can be viewed as insurance of human capital; what is insurance
ex ante (before the uncertainty has been realized) becomes redistribution ex post (after
one knows the outcome).
Two considerations are important when considering whether or not to employ high
marginal tax rates on labor income as an instrument to address these imperfections. As
a first consideration, benefits must be weighed against costs. Indeed, high marginal
tax rates impose various costs. Section 3.1 focussed on labor-leisure distortions. How-
ever, other potential costs are diminished work effort and human capital accumulation,
thereby harming not only the quantity but also the quality of labor supply. Moreover,
high marginal taxes may hamper labor mobility, stimulate tax avoidance and tax evasion,
and redistribute activities from the formal sector into the informal sector or the black
economy. Finally, they may encourage jobs with substantial nontaxable non-pecuniary
benefits.
The second, related, consideration is whether alternative instruments are available
to combat market imperfections. Often more direct instruments are available to address
the market imperfections.
4.2 Optimal progressivity from an efficiency point of view
This sub-section explores the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax in a stan-
dard search model of the labor market. With homogeneous households, a progressive
31
income tax does not generate any distributional benefits. Hence, optimal progressivity
is explored from a pure efficiency point of view. In emphasizing the pure efficiency
case for tax progressivity in imperfect labor markets, the approach is similar to that of
Sørensen (1999), who investigates the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax in
various labor-market models. Whereas Sørensen (1999) relies on numerical simulations,
we derive an explicit analytical solution for the optimal labor income tax. This allows
us to gain more insight into the determinants of optimal progression.
To investigate optimal progression in imperfect labor markets, we simplify the
workhorse of modern labor economics — the search model developed by Mortensen and
Pissarides (see, e.g., Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)) — by for-
mulating a one-shot, static version of the model. While facilitating the interpretation of
the results considerably, the simplified model still contains the main determinants of the
optimal system. Most importantly, it retains the major market failure of the standard
search model: search activities, which amount to specific investments in a labor-market
relationship, are non-contractible and may thus be held up.48 We explore how the tax
system, by acting as a commitment device, can avoid hold-up of search activities. By
efficiently allocating property rights, the tax system in effect acts as a substitute for
complete contracts in protecting the appropriate incentives for search activities. In this
way, the tax system internalizes both positive and negative search externalities.
The crucial element here is that wages are negotiated after search efforts on both
sides of the labor market have been sunk. The quasi rents from the search activities are
thus distributed on the basis of ex-post bargaining power rather than the marginal ef-
fectiveness of search in generating matches. Accordingly, if the marginal productivity of
search activities exceeds the ex-post bargaining power, specific investments in the match
are held up. This hold-up problem arises because the party with excessive bargaining
power cannot credibly commit to reward his partner according to her contribution to
concluding the match. Indeed, parties can bargain only after they have met. Since
contracts can thus be signed only after the contracting parties have sunk their search
activities, the market for search is missing. The missing market for specific investments
in the match is the key non-tax distortion in the model.
48
Also Hosios (1990) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) formulate static versions of the search model.
See also Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
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4.2.1 model
The sequencing of decisions is as follows. In the first stage of the one-shot game, tax
policy is set. In the second stage, firms enter. In the third stage, workers and firms (or
entrepreneurs or employers), which are unmatched, search for a partner on the labor
market. At the supply side of the labor market, workers i ∈ [0, 1] select their search
intensities 0 ≤ X
i
≤ 1 at a cost γ(X
i
) ≥ 0, with γ′′(.) > 0 and lim
X
i
↑1
γ′(X
i
) → +∞.
At the demand side, entrepreneurs simultaneously decide how many vacancies to create.
Vacancy costs are linear, so that economy-wide vacancy costs amount to cD, where D
denotes the economy-wide number of vacancies and c are the per-unit vacancy costs.
In the fourth stage of the game, workers and entrepreneurs are matched; the num-
ber of matches equals m(X,D), where X =
∫
1
0
X
i
di. The matching function m(., .) is
increasing in its two arguments. Moreover, it exhibits constant returns in both argu-
ments together, but decreasing returns in each of the arguments separately. Since a
Cobb Douglas matching function fits the data rather well,49 we assume that the match-
ing function is of the Cobb Douglas form where the exponent of the vacancies is given
by η.
After they have been matched, workers and entrepreneurs bargain about the (after-
tax) wage rate W in the fifth stage of the game. Entrepreneurs and workers who do not
find a match receive a payoff of, respectively, zero and the (after-tax) unemployment (or
welfare) benefit B. The unemployment benefit B can be interpreted as the minimum
standard of living that the government guarantees.50 Finally, output is produced, taxes
are collected and tax revenues G are spent on a public good.
The model is solved backwards. Accordingly, before determining search intensities
X and labor-market tightness θ ≡ D
X
, we solve for (after-tax) wages.
production Each matched firm-worker combination produces Y units of output. Out-
put is the numeraire. Output net of search costs, Ω, is given by
Ω = m(X,D)Y − γ(X)− cD, (12)
where m(X,D)Y represents total output and γ(X) + cD stands for total search costs.
The exogenous public good G and the exogenous unemployment benefit B are financed
49
See, e.g., Broersma and Van Ours (1999).
50
This is in fact optimal if the utility function of individuals is given by u(Y ) =
{
−∞ if Y < B
Y if Y ≥ B
.
Note that the unemployment benefit is not subject to the labor income tax. Boone and Bovenberg
(2002) explore the model developed here with B = 0.
33
by a linear tax on wages:
G+B = m(X,D)(τ (W −B) + τ
a
+B). (13)
Here, τ represents the proportional (or ad valorem) tax on wages (net of the unem-
ployment benefit B). The other component of the linear wage tax, τ
a
, is a fixed (or
specific) tax on the match. This tax depends only on the existence of a match and is
not conditioned on how the quasi-rents from the match are shared between firms and
workers. Wage taxation is progressive (i.e. the average tax burden rises with the wage)
if the specific tax τ
a
is negative.
wage setting Wages are determined by Nash bargaining after a match has been found.
The bargaining is about the (after-tax) quasi rent (or surplus) from the match, Y−τ(W−
B)− τ
a
− B. The after-tax wage W that maximizes the Nash Bargaining function (W−
B)
β
(Y −W − τ (W− B)− τ
a
)1−β is given by
W =
β(Y − τ
a
+ τB) + (1− β)(1 + τ )B
1 + τ
. (14)
This is the value of the match for the worker. The value of a match for the entrepreneur,
Π, amounts to
Π ≡ Y −W (1 + τ) + τB − τ
a
= (1− β)(Y − τ
a
−B). (15)
The burden of the fixed tax component τ
a
is shared between the worker (i.e. the supply
side of the labor market) and the firm (i.e. the demand side of the labor market) in
proportion to their respective bargaining powers β and (1−β); after-tax wagesW decline
and before-tax wages (i.e. wage costs) W (1+ τ )+ τ
a
rise with τ
a
. The proportional tax
rate τ , in contrast, reduces only the worker’s value of a match (14); before-tax wages
W + τ( W− B) + τ
a
and the firm’s value of the match (15) are not affected by τ .
The proportional tax rate thus bears on the supply side rather than the demand side of
the labor market. Intuitively, by taxing the quasi rents that accrue to workers (i.e. the
after-tax wageW ), the proportional tax not only reduces the (after-tax) surplus from the
match but also raises the effective bargaining strength of employers. In the presence of
a higher proportional tax, employers bargain more aggressively because a given increase
in the after-tax wage W results in a larger increase in wage costs W (1 + τ ) + τ
a
.
search intensity and vacancies The wage agreed upon in ex-post bargaining (i.e.
after the match has been concluded) affects the incentives facing workers and firms to
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search for a partner in the preceding stage of the game. In selecting their search intensity,
workers trade off additional search costs against the higher probability of finding a job.
With a constant-returns-to-scale matching function, the probability that a worker with
search intensity X
i
is matched with a firm can be written as a function of labor-market
tightness only: Xi
X
m(X, D) = X
i
m(θ) where m(θ) ≡ m(1, θ). The risk-neutral worker
selects search intensity X
i
so as to maximize the expected surplus from search
max
X
i
≥0
{X
i
m(θ)(W −B)− γ(X
i
)}.
With homogeneous individuals, all households feature the same search intensity
γ′(X) = m(θ)(W −B), (16)
where the left-hand side represents the marginal costs from higher search intensity and
the right-hand side the corresponding expected marginal benefit in terms of raising the
probability of finding a job. The net expected surplus for the worker, Xm(θ)( W−
B)− γ( X) = Xγ′( X)− γ( X), is assumed to be positive.
The expression for optimal search intensity (16) can be interpreted as the implicit
labor-supply equation. With the aid of (14), labor supply can alternatively be written
as
γ′(X) = m(θ)
β(Y − τ
a
−B)
1 + τ
. (17)
Demand for labor is determined by firms. The probability that a firm is matched
with a worker equals m(X,D)
D
= m(θ)
θ
. With free entry of firms, expected profits from
posting an additional vacancy are zero
c =
m(θ)
θ
Π =
m(θ)
θ
(1− β)(Y − τ
a
−B). (18)
Here the left-hand side represents the costs for a firm entering the labor market, while
the right-hand side stands for the firm’s expected benefits of doing so. By reducing
the probability of filling a vacancy m(θ)
θ
, a tighter labor market decreases the expected
benefits from posting a vacancy. Since labor-market tightness θ is the only endogenous
variable in (18), the free-entry condition determines tightness as a function of τ
a
. As in
most non-competitive models of the labor market, a more progressive tax system (i.e.
a smaller value for τ
a
) raises the employment rate (i.e. the number of matches per unit
of labor supply) m(X,D)/X = m(θ).
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Welfare Substituting the government budget constraint,Xm(θ)Y =Xm(θ) [W +Π]+
G+ (1− Xm(θ)) B into the expression for Ω in (12), we find
Ω = Xm(θ) [W −B +Π]+G+B − γ(X)− cθX
= Xγ′(X)− γ(X) +G+B.
With the free-entry condition ensuring a zero expected return for entrepreneurs, welfare
consists of the ex-ante return to workers Xm(θ)( W− B)−γ( X)+ B and the resources
allocated to the government G. The second equality follows from (16) (to eliminate W )
and (18) (to eliminate Π). Since G and B are exogenously given and Xγ′(X)− γ(X) is
rising in X, maximizing welfare is equivalent to maximizing search X.
Optimal progressiveness If the government employs τ and τ
a
to maximize welfare
and search, it sets τ
a
according to (see the Appendix)
τ
a
≡
1− β − η
1− β
Y −B. (19)
The optimal degree of progressiveness of the income tax ensures that the matching
process is efficient by establishing an efficient distribution of property rights over the
fruits from non-contractible specific investments in search. In particular, the party that
carries out the most important non-contractible investments should be able to reap
most of the quasi rents from the relationship. In this way, property rights act as a
substitute for complete contracts in protecting the incentives for specific investments.
By moderating wages, a progressive tax system in effect allows firms to increase their
share in the quasi rents from search. A progressive tax system is thus optimal if firms can
not reap the full social benefits of their search effort in a laissez-faire equilibrium. This
is the case if vacancies are important in generating matches (as reflected in a high value
for η) and workers can appropriate a large share of the surplus from the match because
of substantial bargaining power β and a good outside option B.51 In that case, workers
in effect levy an implicit tax on the specific investments of employers (i.e. the posting of
vacancies) by expropriating part of the marginal social benefits of these investments.52
With employers being held up by workers, labor demand (i.e. the posting of vacancies)
51
A proportional tax is optimal if unemployment benefits are absent (i.e. B = 0) and the so-called
Hosios condition holds. The latter condition (see Hosios (1990)), which reads 1−β = η, states that the
bargaining power of firms 1 − β should correspond to the effectiveness of firms in producing matches
as measured by η.
52
Unions can affect hold-up problems. On the one hand, they may worsen these problems if, by
monopolizing labor supply in an industry, they are able to hold up firms’ investments that are specific
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is too low from a social point of view. A progressive tax undoes the implicit ’hold-up’
tax levied by workers on employers so that employers face adequate incentives to enter
the labor market. By in effect subsidizing labor demand and taxing labor supply, tax
policy restores the socially optimal mix of labor demand and supply.
Tax policy, which is set before search activities are determined, allows workers to
commit to not expropriate firms. In this way, tax policy effectively creates the market for
search that is missing in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Before workers and firms meet each
other after they match, tax policy in effect allows them to conclude a contract stipulating
that their search activities will be rewarded according to the marginal contribution to
the match. Indeed, if workers would vote on the tax rate in the first stage of the game
(i.e. when they are still unmatched and in effect face infinitely elastic labor demand),
they would vote for the optimal social contract (i.e. the optimal allocation of property
rights) implicit in the optimal tax structure.
The results can be interpreted also in terms of the distortions due to imperfect
competition. If workers exercise too much power ex post (i.e. 1−β−η
1−β
Y− B < 0 so that θ
is too low), the market can be characterized as being monopolized. Tax policy corrects
the associated monopoly distortions by levying a tax on the excessive wages. In this
way, tax policy offsets the implicit taxes imposed by the party with excessive market
power.
An efficient matching process maximizes the incentives of workers to participate
in this matching process through labor supply. If the bargaining power of workers is too
strong (i.e. τ
a
− 1−β−η
1−β
Y+ B > 0), workers are discouraged from looking for a job by a
low probability of finding a job on account of a lax labor market (as reflected in a low
value for tightness θ).53 The unemployment rate is too high in that case. If workers’
bargaining power is too weak (i.e. τ
a
− 1−β−η
1−β
Y+ B < 0), workers’ search is depressed by
excessively low wages. Accordingly, beyond the point at which τ
a
≡ 1−β−η
1−β
Y− B a more
progressive tax system harms the efficiency of the matching process by reducing labor
to this industry. On the other hand, unions tend to feature a longer time horizon than individual workers
do. The reputational mechanism may thus induce them to keep their commitments to moderate wages,
thereby alleviating the hold-up problem. These opposite effects of unions resemble the opposite effects
of industry unions worsening monopoly distortions and national unions internalizing externalities (as
discussed in sub-section 3.2.3).
53
Thus, progressive taxation and wage moderation may raise labor supply if workers have excessive
bargaining power in the laissez-fair equilibrium. This contrasts with models (explored in the section
3.1) that focus on the intensive rather than the extensive margin of labor supply and in which labor
supply is set after workers have found a job. In these models, the discouraged-worker effect is absent
and the unemployment rate thus does not depress labor supply.
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supply and in effect giving the supply side of the labor market insufficient bargaining
power compared to labor demand.54 As a direct consequence, labor supply is too low
compared to labor demand. The resulting excessively tight labor market implies that
the unemployment rate 1−m(X,D)/X is too low from a pure efficiency point of view.
The optimal τ
a
does not depend on revenue requirements. The intuition behind
this result is the following. The linear vacancy costs imply that demand for labor is
infinitely elastic. Hence, firms are able to shift the entire tax burden required to finance
government spending to workers. Thus, whereas a tax on labor supply, τ , taxes the
supply side directly through a lower after-tax wage W , a tax on labor demand τ
a
is
also borne by labor supply — albeit indirectly (namely, through the general equilibrium
effect of fewer firms entering the labor market, which reduces the probability of finding
a job by producing a less tight labor market). It is more efficient to tax workers directly
through τ than indirectly through the general equilibrium effect on θ; both ways distort
search intensity, but the second way distorts also labor-market tightness.55
This result is closely related to the celebrated Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) result on
the optimality of production efficiency. With constant-returns-to-scale production (or
tax instruments to tax away rents due to decreasing returns) and sufficient tax instru-
ments to tax consumers directly, the government should ensure production efficiency.
The government finds it optimal to tax consumers directly through consumer taxes
rather than indirectly through taxes that violate production efficiency. Similarly, in the
current context, the government should not distort labor-market tightness, θ, by raising
revenues through τ
a
. Indeed, keeping labor-market tightness at its first-best level can
be viewed as maintaining efficiency in the production of matches.
A higher unemployment benefit is translated into an equivalent increase in in-work
benefits τ
a
(i.e. −dτ
a
= dB). A higher unemployment benefit thus results in a more
progressive tax system, as a higher in-work benefit in effect offsets the adverse impact
of the unemployment benefit on job creation. The benefit system thus determines the
optimal progressiveness of the labor tax. The combination of an employment benefit
and a job subsidy can be interpreted as a basic income. Indeed, if the Hosios condition
54
This contrasts with the union model explored in section 3.2. In that model, which abstracts
from endogenous labor supply, the optimal marginal tax rate is 100 %, resulting in the elimination of
involuntary unemployment.
55
This strong result no longer holds if labor demand is not infinitely elastic with respect to wage
costs because firms cannot freely enter the labor market and a lump-sum profit tax is not feasible (see
Boone and Bovenberg (2002)). In that case, not only τ but also τ
a
rises with the government revenue
requirement.
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is met, the overall tax on job creation is zero (i.e. τ
a
+B = 0). The higher marginal tax
rates depress labor supply but it is more efficient to depress labor supply through lower
after-tax wages than to depress labor supply indirectly through violating production
efficiency.56 A progressive tax (i.e. τ
a
< 0) thus offsets the distortions of the welfare
system.
5 Employment and distribution: applied general equi-
librium analysis
This section explores the impact of labor tax reform with the help of an applied general
equilibrium model for the Netherlands, the so-called MIMIC model developed at CPB
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. The model combines a rich theoreti-
cal framework based on modern economic theories, a firm empirical foundation, and an
elaborate description of the actual tax and social insurance systems in the Netherlands.
The model considers the two main transmission channels through which tax policy im-
pacts the labor market, namely, labor supply and wage determination. In addition, it
considers various other ways through which taxes and benefits affect the labor market
namely, the black economy, human capital accumulation, efficiency wages, costly job
matching, and search behavior of the unemployed. Hence, in addition to wages, un-
employment and the quantity of labor supply, taxes affect the quality of labor supply.
Through the replacement rate, the benefit system affects not only wage setting but also
search intensity and the reservation wages of the unemployed.
5.1 MIMIC model
This sub-section provides a bird-eye’s view of MIMIC (Graafland e.a. (2001) provides
a more detailed overview of the model). MIMIC allows for considerable heterogeneity
among households. In particular, the model accounts for heterogeneity in household
composition (including the number of children), educational level, age, ability, prefer-
ences for leisure, and labor-market status. Incorporating this heterogeneity allows one
to explore the income distribution and hence various trade-offs between equity and effi-
56
With less than infinitely elastic labor demand, higher unemployment benefits would in part be
financed through lower job subsidies τ
a
so that τ
a
+B > 0. A similar result holds in a model in which
labor supply is endogenous on not only the extensive margin but also the intensive margin (see section
6).
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ciency. Moreover, Tables 3 and 4 document on fact that replacement rates and marginal
tax rates vary considerably across various individuals, depending on household compo-
sition and income level. The same holds true for labor-supply elasticities.57 Whereas
particular policies may have little impact on a representative individual, they may signifi-
cantly affect the behavior of particular types of individuals, such as secondary part-time
workers, low-skilled agents and older employees close to retirement (see also Disney
(2000)). A careful analysis of the labor-supply effects of tax policy therefore requires
substantial disaggregation. Indeed, representative agent models conceal this variation
in effective tax rates and labor-supply behavior.
MIMIC embeds a standard microsimulation model in a general equilibrium setting.
As an applied general equilibrium model, MIMIC draws on microeconomic theory to de-
rive supply and demand from optimizing behavior by decentralized agents. This allows
one to interpret the model results in terms of microeconomic behavior of households and
firms. In modelling equilibrium on the labor market, the model departs from the tradi-
tional assumption of market clearing in most general equilibrium models. In modelling
labor-market imperfections that give rise to involuntary unemployment, MIMIC em-
ploys modern labor-market theories. In particular, in addition to legal minimum wages,
it includes elements of wage bargaining, efficiency wages and costly job matching. In
this way the model describes equilibrium unemployment in terms of the structure of the
tax system, minimum wages and the features of social insurance and assistance.
MIMIC has a firm empirical basis. Various crucial relationships in the model,
including contractual wage formation and the production function, have been estimated
from time series data. Furthermore, microeconometric estimates on Dutch labor supply
helped to calibrate the labor-supply model. Moreover, income distributions are based
on micro data.
MIMIC describes the institutional features of taxation and social insurance in
much detail. This institutional detail makes the model especially relevant for policy
making because actual policy proposals typically involve particular details of the tax
and social insurance systems. Moreover, as section 3.2 documents, the impact of tax
policies depend crucially on how unemployment and welfare benefits respond to changes
in wages and taxes.
Incorporating the main transmission channels of tax policy in an empirically based
57
This is shown by microeconometric evidence. Econometric work on labor-supply behavior is in-
creasingly exploiting this microeconomic variation and is hence moving away from macroeconomic
estimation.
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model with substantial household heterogeneity is not without costs. In particular, the
various sub-models are not fully consistent with each other. To illustrate, the wage
setting model does not take into account endogenous labor supply. Moreover, the labor-
supply model assumes that households are not rationed on the labor market. At the
same time, the models describing search behavior of the unemployed and training and
schooling are not part of the household model describing labor supply.
5.1.1 households and labor supply
MIMIC distinguishes 40 types of households in order to adequately describe labor sup-
ply and explore the income distribution. In particular, MIMIC distinguishes couples,
single persons, single parents, pensioners and students. To model the specific labor-
supply behavior of those close to retirement, people aged between 55 and 65 years are
represented by a separate household type. Couples consist of a so-called breadwinner
(i.e. the individual with the highest personal income) and a partner (i.e. the adult with
the lowest personal income). Couples are subdivided into families with children and
families without children. Individuals within each household may differ with respect to
their skill level (high skilled, low skilled or unskilled) and their job status (i.e holding a
job in the formal sector, unemployed and collecting a social benefit, or not participating
in the labor force).
For each household type, MIMIC employs class-frequency income distributions
based on micro data to describe the distribution of gross incomes. These income dis-
tributions are important determinants of the efficiency costs of high marginal tax rates:
the more people are concentrated in a particular income range, the higher become the
efficiency costs of high marginal rates in this income range. By applying the correspond-
ing statutory tax and premium rates to gross incomes, MIMIC determines net incomes
and the average and marginal tax rates that affect labor-supply decisions.
The labor-supply model has been calibrated so that the model reproduces labor-
supply elasticities estimated in the empirical literature for the Netherlands. In particu-
lar, the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply by partners is set at 1.0, single
persons feature a corresponding elasticity of 0.25 and most breadwinners of around 0.1.
Older breadwinners, who may change their retirement decisions in response to changes
in wages, feature a somewhat higher elasticity of 0.15. The income elasticities of labor
supply are smaller than the corresponding wage elasticities — namely, 0.2 for partners,
0.05 for single persons and almost zero for breadwinners. In addition to supplying labor
to the formal labor market, households can supply labor to the black labor market. The
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model has been calibrated to reproduce the size of the black economy in the Nether-
lands, which is estimated at about 3% of GDP, and an uncompensated wage elasticity
of black labor supply of 0.75.
A separate training model endogenizes the distribution of the labor force over un-
skilled, low-skilled and high-skilled workers. By engaging in training activities, workers
can increase the transition rates to higher skill levels with higher wages. In setting their
training level, workers trade off (non-taxable) effort costs and the benefits of training
(in terms of a higher probability of moving towards a higher skill level earning a higher
wage). Based on Groot and Oosterbeek (1995), the model is calibrated such that a 10
% increase in after-tax wage differentials raises the share of workers participating in
training by 8 %.
5.1.2 wage formation
The black labor market is modelled as the competitive labor market in section 3.1; for
each of the three skill categories, the wage clears this market. Firms in the sheltered
sector and the construction sector58 demand labor from the black market. The elasticity
of substitution between black and formal labor in the production function is set at 2,
which is based on empirical evidence in Baartmans et al. (1986). Furthermore, firms
may pay formal labor in part informally, i.e. without reporting the wages to the tax
authorities. Firms determine this informal labor by trading off lower taxes against a
potential penalty for fraud.
The formal labor markets for the three skill categories do not clear. The imperfec-
tions of this market originate in market power of unions, efficiency wages and costly job
matching. To describe wage formation in these markets, MIMIC distinguishes between
contractual wages, which are determined in collective bargaining between employers and
unions, and incidental wages, which are set by individual employers based on the tight-
ness of the skill-specific labor markets. Social benefits are linked to contractual, rather
than incidental, wages.
Contractual wages are determined by a right-to-manage model in which employers
and unions bargain over wages at the industry level. The rents that unions and employers
bargain over originate in the market power of firms on product markets. In particular,
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In addition to these two sectors, MIMIC includes a mining sector, a residential sector and an
exposed sector, which consists not only of capital-intensive manufacturing industries subject to intense
foreign competition but also of agriculture and transport. The sheltered sector includes trade, banking
and insurances, and other private services.
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each industry produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for goods produced by
other domestic industries or by foreign firms. The unions are small compared to the
labor market as a whole and therefore do not internalize the impact of their bargain on
the government budget constraint, profits and prices.
The resulting wage equation is calibrated on the basis of estimates by Graafland
and Huizinga (1999). Using macro data, they found that the positive elasticity of the
average tax rate is six times as large in absolute value as the negative elasticity of
the marginal tax rate (-0.1). The elasticity of the consumer price equals the sum of
the elasticities of the marginal and average tax rates, which is 0.5. Accordingly, at
constant unemployment and replacement rates, the incidence of a higher tax wedge
(by simultaneously increasing average and marginal tax rates) is split equally between
employers and employees through higher gross wages and lower after-tax wages. On
average, the wage elasticity of the replacement rate is about 0.2.59
The wage structure among skills is further modified by a skill-specific, so-called
incidental, wage component. The employer uses this incidental wage component to
minimize search costs. The incidental wage can thus be interpreted as an efficiency
wage associated with hiring costs. It is set as a mark-up on the contractual wage. This
mark up rises with the tightness of the labor market.
5.1.3 job matching
To model labor-market tightness and mismatch, MIMIC incorporates costly job match-
ing. Heterogeneity in the matching process allows MIMIC to model also the adverse
impact of high minimum wages and high reservation wages on the efficiency of the
matching process. In particular, low-productivity matches may fail because they do not
meet the minimum productivity standard of the employer (determined by the minimum
wage) or the reservation wage of the unemployed.
In the matching model, the behavior of the unemployed is described in terms of
the reservation wage and search intensity. In particular, in setting search intensity, the
unemployed trade off the loss of leisure against the increased probability of moving into
59
Since both skill-specific and macroeconomic factors play a role in determining skill-specific wages,
skill-specific wages are determined by both a macroeconomic wage equation, which adopts macro-
aggregates for the average tax rate, the marginal tax rate, the replacement rate and unemployment,
and a corresponding skill-specific wage equation, which employs skill-specific explanatory variables.
Based on Graafland and Lever (1996), the macro and skill-specific wage equations carry equal weights
in determining the contractual wage for a specific skill.
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the employed state. The optimal search intensity increases in the average transition
rate into employment (because it raises the marginal return on search) and decreases
in the replacement rate (which decreases the difference in life-time utility between the
employed and unemployed states). The second variable describing the behavior of the
unemployed is the reservation wage, which is the wage at which an unemployed job
seeker is indifferent between the employed and the unemployed states. The reservation
wage rises with both the unemployment benefit and the average transition rate into
employment. Together with the lognormal wage distribution of job offers, the reservation
wage determines the acceptance rate of the unemployed (i.e. the share of contacts that is
acceptable to unemployed job seekers). A higher replacement rate thus exacerbates the
mismatch on the labor market by lowering search intensity and raising the reservation
wage. This pushes up incidental wages, thereby raising unemployment in equilibrium.
The long-term unemployed typically differ from the short-term unemployed in their
search behavior, reservation wage and productivity. MIMIC therefore distinguishes be-
tween short- and long-term unemployment by using a steady-state flow model for job
matches akin to Holmlund and Linden (1993).60 In particular, the long-term unemployed
are less productive than the short-term unemployed because they lost some human cap-
ital during their prolonged period of unemployment. If they find a job, the long-term
unemployed face some (exogenous) probability to restore their human capital. The long-
term unemployed take into account this benefit of entering work and hence feature a
relatively low reservation wage. Accordingly, rather than the reservation wage, the min-
imum effective productivity standard of the employer, which is determined mainly by
the minimum wage, mainly restricts the number of successful matches for the long-term
unemployed. For the short-term unemployed, in contrast, a relatively high reservation
wage is the most important barrier to successful job matches. As a relatively large num-
ber of long-term unemployed are unskilled, the minimum effective productivity standard
(and hence the minimum wage) is the most important barrier in the job-matching pro-
cess of the unskilled. The model is calibrated so as to conform closely to the observed
transition rates between the various states and to the main empirical findings on search
intensities and reservation wages.
5.1.4 public institutions
MIMIC contains several public institutions, including the Dutch personal income tax
system in 1998. The personal income tax features a tax-free allowance and three tax
60
A detailed description of this model can be found in Jongen and Graafland (1998).
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brackets. A partner whose labor income remains below the tax-free allowance can trans-
fer the tax-free allowance to the breadwinner. The rate in the first tax bracket is about
36% in 1998. The tax rate in the second bracket is 50% and has to be paid on incomes
above about 25,000 euro. The marginal rate in the third tax bracket, which amounts
to 60%, is paid on incomes above about 50,000 euro. Workers benefit from a special
earned-income tax deduction, which amounts to 12% of labor income with a maximum
of around 1500 euro. Unemployment benefits are subject to the progressive personal
income tax. VAT in the Netherlands imposes a low rate on necessary goods (6%) and a
high rate for other goods (17%). Other public institutions in MIMIC include employee
and national social insurance schemes,61 the employers’ and employees’ contributions
to employee social insurances, premiums for health insurance, the statutory minimum
wage (which is linked to the average contractual wage rate), social assistance (which is
linked to the statutory minimum wage), and a number of policy instruments targeted at
specific groups, such as the long-term unemployed and the unskilled. Households with
incomes just above the minimum wage face overall effective marginal tax rates close to
80 % on account of employee insurance premiums, income-dependent public health care
premiums, and means-tested housing allowances. Indeed, overall marginal taxes in this
income range exceed marginal tax rates (of 60 %) facing high-income earners.
5.2 Cutting taxes in MIMIC
This section employs the MIMIC model to investigate the long-run effects of a number
of tax cuts. In all experiments, the ex-ante (i.e. before behavioral responses have been
taken into account) reduction in tax revenues amounts to 0.25 % of GDP. A cut in
public consumption balances the government budget ex post (i.e. after the effects of
the behavioral responses on the public budget have been taken into account). Hence,
the required cut in public consumption reflects the impact of behavioral responses on
the public budget. In particular, if the reduction in public consumption is less than
the ex-ante cut in revenues of 0.25 % of GDP, behavioral responses help to mitigate
budgetary costs.
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Employee insurances apply only to working people and cover employment risks — namely, unemploy-
ment, disability, and sickness. Benefits depend on previously earned wages. All residents are entitled
to national social insurance, which involves family allowances, disability benefits for the handicapped,
special health costs, and a basic pension. In contrast to benefits from employee insurances, benefits
from national social insurance are not related to previously earned wages.
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This section consists of three parts. The first part explores cuts in personal income
taxes. The second part turns to cuts in social security contributions (i.e. payroll taxes)
paid by employers. Finally, the third part investigates various forms of an Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) aimed at increasing the reward of work in general and of low-skilled
work in particular.
5.2.1 personal income taxation
Cutting marginal tax rates The detailed modelling of the personal income tax
system allows MIMIC to explore the labor-market effects of various parameters of the
Dutch tax system. The first three columns of Table 6 contain the long-run effects of
cuts in each of the three tax brackets of the Dutch personal income tax (of respectively
1.2, 6.9 and 24.5 % points). These tax cuts reduce both marginal and average tax rates.
However, the tax cut in the first bracket is inframarginal for many workers whose incomes
reach into the second and third tax brackets. Hence, this particular tax cut reduces the
average marginal tax rate (i.e. the marginal tax rate averaged over the various workers)
substantially less than tax cuts in the higher brackets do (see the next-to-last row of
Table 6). Indeed, in contrast to a reduction in the tax rates in the upper brackets, a tax
cut in the lowest bracket makes the tax system somewhat more progressive (as measured
by the coefficient of residual income progression).
Labor supply
All three tax cuts boost aggregate labor supply (in hours) because the substitution
effect associated with a lower marginal tax rate dominates the income effect on account
of a lower average tax rate. The composition of additional labor supply, however, differs.
In particular, a lower tax rate in the first bracket raises especially the labor supply of
partners (i.e. secondary earners). This is because partners tend to work in part-time
jobs with relatively low (annual) labor incomes. Hence, their marginal labor income
is typically subject to the tax rate in the first bracket. A cut in this tax rate there-
fore encourages partners to work longer hours, especially in view of the relatively large
uncompensated wage elasticity of partner’s labor supply.
Breadwinners and older workers generally earn higher labor incomes than partners
do. Indeed, the incomes of many of these workers reach into the second or third tax
brackets. For these workers, a lower tax rate in the first bracket reduces the average
tax rate without affecting the marginal tax rate. The inframarginal character of the tax
cut in the first bracket for many breadwinners explains why such a cut barely affects
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aggregate labor supply of breadwinners and older workers; the income effect is relevant
for all breadwinners and older workers, while the substitution effect applies only to those
workers whose marginal labor income falls in the first bracket.
In contrast to tax cuts in the first bracket, tax cuts in the second and third brackets
are effective in stimulating labor supply of breadwinners and older workers. Although
these groups feature relatively low labor-supply elasticities, the relatively large cuts in
marginal tax rates produce significant labor-supply responses. The impact on aggregate
labor supply (in hours) is substantial because breadwinners, single persons and elderly
account for a large share of aggregate labor supply (in hours). Tax cuts in the highest
bracket discourage partners from supplying labor, because the income effect rather than
the substitution effect mainly impacts the labor supply of partners. In particular, by
raising the incomes of breadwinners, a tax cut in the highest bracket reduces partners’
labor supply through the channel of higher household incomes. At the same time, the
substitution effect is not important because only few partners earn incomes that are
sufficiently high to be marginally taxed in the third bracket.
These simulations illustrate the added value of the extensive labor-supply model
of MIMIC, which accounts for heterogeneity in preferences and wages, incorporates
the actual Dutch tax system, and explicitly models labor supply of partners. The
incorporation of the actual income distribution and the institutional detail of the Dutch
tax system allows MIMIC to determine to what extent cuts in particular tax brackets
are (infra)marginal. Furthermore, the explicit modelling of labor-supply behavior of
partners and breadwinners modifies the predictions from aggregate models. To illustrate,
tax cuts in the first brackets are more inframarginal and thus reduce marginal tax rates,
on average, only a third as much as tax cuts in the higher brackets do (see the next-
to-last row of Table 6). Despite the relatively small decline in average marginal tax
rates, tax cuts in the first bracket are still quite effective in stimulating aggregate labor
supply. The reason is that these tax cuts reduce marginal tax rates of partners — the
group featuring the most elastic labor supply. Indeed, these tax cuts are most effective
in raising labor supply in persons, as more partners are encouraged to enter the labor
force.
Black labor supply and training
All three tax cuts reduce the size of the black economy. Supply of black-market
labor declines because lower marginal income taxes make formal labor supply more
attractive. Firm demand for black labor decreases because formal wage costs decline
on account of a lower average tax burden. This encourages firms to hire formal rather
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than informal labor. Tax cuts in the higher brackets are most effective in combatting
the black economy because these tax cuts reduce marginal tax rates most.
The lower marginal tax rates in the upper tax brackets raise the marginal return
on training activities. Accordingly, human capital and labor productivity increase and
the expansion of production exceeds the rise in employment.
Unemployment
The income tax cuts reduce equilibrium unemployment for two main reasons.62
The first is the drop in the average tax burden, which moderates contractual wages.
The lower marginal tax wedge produces upward wage pressure, but the positive elas-
ticity of the average tax burden in the contractual wage equation (of 0.6) substantially
exceeds the absolute value of the negative elasticity of the marginal tax burden (of 0.1).
Hence, the overall effect of the tax cut is to moderate wages, thereby reducing equi-
librium unemployment. Cutting taxes in the first bracket is most effective in reducing
unemployment through this channel because it combines the decline in the average tax
burden (the magnitude of which is similar for tax cuts in each of the three brackets)
with the smallest decline in the marginal tax rate.
The second factor explaining the decline in unemployment is the lower replacement
rate; workers tend to benefit more from lower marginal rates of personal income tax than
transfer recipients do because the incomes of workers tend to exceed those of transfer
recipients. This is especially so for tax reductions in the second bracket of the income
tax.63
Subtracting the results of the second column from those of the first column, one
finds the impact of increasing tax progression by using revenues from a higher tax rate
in the second tax bracket to cut the first tax bracket. Increasing progression in this way
leaves the unemployment rate more or less unaffected. The replacement rate effect thus
offsets the direct wage moderation effect associated with a higher marginal tax rate.64
Employment
The three tax cuts raise aggregate employment through the channels of both lower
62
According to these simulations, a cut of one percentage point in the average tax burden reduces
the unemployment rate by about 0.3 percentage point. This is somewhat higher than the estimates of
Nickell and Layard (1999) and similar to the estimates of Daveri and Tabellini (2000).
63
The tax rate in the third bracket exerts a smaller effect on the replacement rate because this income
range is less relevant for unemployed persons.
64
Sub-section 3.2.3 identifies these two effects in an analytical right-to-manage model in which un-
employment benefits are subject to the progressive labor income tax.
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unemployment and higher labor supply. In fact, all tax cuts generate a similar increase
in aggregate employment. However, the composition of the employment gains differs.
A tax cut in the first bracket is most effective in raising employment for the unskilled,
low skilled and partners. The other tax cuts are somewhat more effective in boosting
aggregate labor supply (in hours) and high-skilled employment and in combatting the
black economy.
raising the tax allowance We now turn to the effects of raising the general tax
allowance (see the fourth column in Table 6). Partners who do not earn sufficient labor
income to fully use the tax allowance can transfer the allowance to the breadwinner.
The tax credit is thus in fact refundable for households with non-participating partners.
Hence, this tax credit reduces the average tax burden but leaves the marginal tax burden
unaffected, even for partners with small part-time jobs.65 The tax allowance applies to
both transfer recipients and workers.
Formal labor supply falls because the tax credit exerts only income effects on labor
supply. Unemployment declines despite an increase in the average replacement rate. The
unemployed benefit relatively more from a tax credit than those in work because the
unemployed typically collect lower incomes than the employed. The main reason for
lower equilibrium unemployment is that the lower average tax burden together with the
constant marginal tax burden moderates contractual wages.
To summarize, a lower average tax rate at a constant marginal tax rate reduces
both labor supply and unemployment. On balance, aggregate employment expands
somewhat. The main difference with the cuts in tax brackets is thus that labor supply
falls.
5.2.2 payroll taxes
This sub-section explores three alternative ways to reduce the tax burden on employers.
The first two columns of Table 7 contain the effects of two alternative ways to cut social
security contributions (SSC) paid by employers, namely an across-the-board reduction
in the rate of SSC and a targeted reduction of SSC for unskilled workers. A third
experiment involves a two-year subsidy for firms that hire a person who has been long-
term unemployed.
65
For students with low annual incomes, however, the tax allowance reduces the marginal tax rate.
This explains the minor decline in the average marginal tax rate in the next-to-last row of the fourth
column of Table 6.
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Across-the-board reductions of employers’ SSC The first column of Table 7
shows the effects of an across-the-board cut in payroll tax paid by employers. Cuts in
the rate of SSC reduce the average tax rate more than the marginal tax rate, thereby
raising the coefficient of progression. This is because the contributions are paid only on
labor incomes up to 36,000 euro. Indeed, the impact of the cut in the SSC rate on the
marginal tax rate and hence on the labor market is quite similar to a weighted average
of a reduction in the tax rate in the first bracket of the personal income tax and an
increase in the general tax allowance (which are explored in sub-section 5.2.1).
The lower SSC burden directly reduces labor costs. Accordingly, employment for
all types of labor expands, while unemployment falls. Workers succeed in collecting part
of the SSC cut in the form of higher net wages. In particular, employees increase their
wage claims in contractual wage formation as the higher profit margin raises the rents
that are bargained over. Moreover, incidental wages rise as firms try to attract more
applicants to fill the increasing number of vacancies. Also recipients of social security
benefits gain because of the institutional link between benefits and contractual wages.
Higher wages mildly stimulate labor supply because substitution effects dominate the
income effects.
Targeted SSC cut In order to enhance the employability of low productivity workers,
the SSC cut can be targeted at unskilled labor. We investigate a targeted SSC cut
for low-skilled labor, which amounts to 1500 Euro for full-time workers earning the
statutory minimum wage. It is phased out between hourly wages of 100% and 130%
of the statutory minimum wage.66 The phasing out of the cut raises the marginal tax
rates on higher hourly wages in this range. However, it does not raise the marginal tax
rate on hours worked because the SSC cut is based on hourly wages and hence increases
proportionally for workers who work longer hours.
A comparison between the first and second columns of Table 7 reveals that a tar-
geted SSC cut is more effective in raising employment than an across-the-board SSC cut
is, especially as far as unskilled employment is concerned. The cut in SSC for unskilled
workers boosts the demand for these workers through substitution towards unskilled la-
bor. Moreover, lower labor costs at the minimum wage level facilitate job matching. In
particular, the lower wage costs reduce the minimum productivity standards due to min-
imum wage scales. Accordingly, an increasing number of unskilled unemployed, which
66
The Dutch government has introduced a reduction in employer’s SSC that is structured similarly:
the so-called SPAK (SPeciale AfdrachtsKorting).
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often feature rather low productivities, meet the minimum productivity standards of
employers. Indeed, as described in sub-section 3.1.2, the minimum wage can be viewed
as a tax on employers. With a cut in SSC paid by employers, the overall tax rate on la-
bor demand (consisting of the implicit tax rate implied by minimum wages and explicit
taxes) is reduced.
The targeted SSC cut suffers from a number of drawbacks. First, gradual reduc-
tions in the tax allowance cause the marginal tax rate on increases in hourly wages to
rise. Accordingly, increasing the net hourly wage is rather expensive because it sub-
stantially raises SSC. The high marginal tax burden on higher hourly wages harms the
incentives for training by unskilled employees. The productivity level of workers there-
fore drops. Indeed, Table 7 reveals that production rises less than employment, which
reflects the loss in human capital of the low skilled. Another disadvantage of a high
marginal tax burden for employers is that it stimulates substitution between formal la-
bor and informal labor. In particular, a high marginal tax burden encourages firms to
pay additional wage income above the formal minimum wage in an informal fashion.
Subsidies for hiring long-term unemployed Snower (1994) proposes marginal
labor subsidies for hiring the long-term unemployed. We analyze the impact of a hiring
subsidy for an employer who hires a worker who has been unemployed for more than
two years. The annual subsidy amounts to about 60 % of the welfare benefit and applies
to the first two years of the employment contract.
The simulation results presented in the third column of Table 7 indicate that the
hiring subsidy for long-term unemployed is more effective in fighting unskilled unem-
ployment than the other policies analyzed until now. Indeed, the cut in labor costs for
long-term unemployed, which typically are unskilled and feature low productivity, is sub-
stantial during the first two years of employment. As a result, the minimum productivity
standard for the long-term unemployed falls. This substantially raises the efficiency of
matching because the minimum productivity standard is the most restrictive factor in
the overall matching process.
In contrast to the targeted cut in SSC, the marginal labor subsidy does not raise
the marginal tax rate for the employer. Accordingly, it neither stimulates the black
economy nor harms the incentives to accumulate human capital. Instead, long-term
unemployed who find a job are able to restore some of the human capital they lost
during prolonged unemployment.
Despite the substantial decline in unskilled unemployment, the results are less fa-
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vorable than Snower (1994) maintains. In particular, the fall in public consumption
indicates that, in contrast to what Snower suggests, the hiring subsidy does not pay for
itself even though the policy is explicitly aimed at recipients of welfare benefits.67 A
major reason is the large dispersion in the productivity distribution for the long-term
unemployed, implying that only a relatively small part of the long-term unemployed
becomes employable. Moreover, the average productivity of the long-term unemployed
is rather low. Hence, enhancing the employability of the long-term unemployed is rather
expensive. Another factor limiting the employment impact is that part of the subsidy
is shifted backwards to the employees, thereby containing the decline in wage costs.
Finally, the higher transition rate of long-term unemployment into employment crowds
out opportunities and incentives of short-term unemployed to find a job, thereby mod-
erating the impact on the overall unemployment rate. This larger so-called substitution
effect (i.e. the job seekers outside the target group that in the absence of the subsidy
would have been hired instead of the subsidized individuals)68 is the price more tar-
geted systems have to pay to contain the deadweight loss (i.e. the share of subsidized
individuals that would have found employment in the absence of the subsidy). This
latter deadweight loss, though, remains quite high. Only for the unskilled, the sum of
deadweight and substitution remains well below 100 % at 60 %, with both deadweight
and substitution accounting for half of this 60 % (see Graafland e.a. (2001)).
5.2.3 earned income tax credit
Table 8 contains the long-term effects of introducing various forms of a tax credit that
applies only to workers — the so-called Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). In several
EU countries, this instrument is increasingly perceived as an attractive instrument to
combat unemployment by raising the return to low-skilled work. This policy in effect
directly reduces the net replacement rate, as the unemployed do not benefit from the
EITC. Hence, an EITC corresponds to the case in which unemployment benefits are not
subject to tax (see sub-section 3.2.3).69
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This is an important difference with the targetted SSC cut. The latter tax cut also benefits married
women and young single persons (e.g. students) who earn low hourly wages but typically do not collect
welfare benefits when unemployed.
68
Displacement, i.e. subsidized individuals displacing incumbent workers, also tends to be larger
under specific policies associated with more targetting. The model does not allow for displacement.
69
In case of a cut in SSC, in contrast, not only workers enjoy higher net wages but also benefit
recipients gain because of the institutional link between wages and benefits.
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Flat EITC The first column of Table 8 contains the impact of a flat EITC of 140 euro
per year (corresponding to about 0.5% of the median gross wage). This non-refundable
EITC reduces the marginal tax rate on small part-time jobs so that partners find it
more attractive to enter the labor force. Accordingly, the participation rate (i.e. labor
supply in persons) increases.
Unemployment declines substantially. The reason is that the EITC accrues
only to those in work and hence reduces the replacement rate. The lower replacement
rate enhances job matching by reducing the reservation wage and by encouraging the
unemployed to search more intensively for a job. Moreover, it moderates contractual
wages. This wage moderation reduces the current incomes from transfer recipients
because social benefits are linked to gross wages.
Targeted EITC based on annual labor incomes The second column of Table 8
explores the impact of an EITC that focuses on raising the reward to low-skilled work.
The EITC analyzed here depends on annual labor income of an individual.70 It amounts
to 3 % of annual labor income of the individual in a phase-in range up to the statutory
minimum wage (13,500 euro) and stays at 340 euro in a flat range up to 115 % of the
minimum wage. Subsequently, the EITC is phased out linearly up to 180 % of the
minimum wage.
The EITC reduces the marginal tax burden on small part-time jobs, thereby
encouraging partners to join the labor force. Accordingly, the participation rate in-
creases. However, aggregate labor supply measured in hours drops. Only partners raise
their average labor supply (in hours) because many partners fall in the phase-in range of
the EITC. Breadwinners and single persons, in contrast, reduce their labor supply be-
cause of a positive income effect and, to the extent that they fall in the phase-out range,
a negative substitution effect associated with a higher marginal tax rate. On balance,
for labor supply in hours, the reduction in labor supply on account of the substitution
effect in the phase-out range and the income effect dominates the positive effect on the
participation rate.
The high marginal tax rate in the phase-out range harms the incentives for train-
ing. This reduces the transition rates into higher skill levels. Hence, unskilled labor
supply rises at the expense of low-skilled labor supply. The changing composition of
labor supply affects the distribution of employment and unemployment over skill levels.
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Hence, this EITC differs from the EITC implemented in the US, which depends on family income
and the number of children in a family.
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Whereas the training effect mitigates the decline in unskilled unemployment, it raises
unskilled employment. Since unskilled workers face a higher replacement ratio than low
skilled workers do, this tends to contain the decline in the average replacement ratio,
thereby moderating the employment gains.
Targeted EITC based on hourly wages If the objective is to reduce the number of
unskilled who collect unemployment and welfare benefits, the targeted EITC explored
above suffers from the disadvantage that it accrues also to part-time workers with high
hourly wages but low annual incomes. This is relevant especially in the Netherlands,
which features the highest share of part-time work of all OECD countries. Hence, in the
Dutch policy discussion, a targeted EITC has been proposed that depends on hourly
wages rather than annual incomes. Workers who earn the hourly minimum wage and
hold a full-time job are eligible for the full EITC. Just as the targeted SSC cut considered
in sub-section 5.2.2, the credit is reduced proportionally for workers who work less than a
full-time job. It gradually drops also with the level of the hourly wage rate. By reducing
the credit for part-time workers with high wages, the EITC for full-time workers who
earn an hourly wage up to 115 % of the statutory minimum wage can almost be doubled
to 625 euro. The phase-out range runs up to an hourly wage of 180% of the minimum
wage.
This EITC reduces the marginal tax burden only on part-time jobs with low hourly
wages. Hence, the effect on the participation rate is smaller than in the previous ex-
periment. The higher marginal tax rate in the phase-out range applies only to higher
hourly wages and not to higher labor incomes on account of more hours worked. In
fact, additional hours worked raise the credit for unskilled workers. This explains why,
in contrast to the case with an EITC based on annual labor income, labor supply (in
hours) increases slightly.
The marginal tax rate on higher hourly wages in the phase-out range is higher than
in the previous experiment because the maximum credit is about twice as large. This
harms the incentives to accumulate human capital. Hence, compared to an EITC that
depends on annual incomes, an EITC that depends on hourly wages does less harm to
the quantity of labor supply but does more harm to the quality of labor supply. Another
drawback of this variant of the EITC is that it relies on additional information (namely
the number of hours worked in the formal sector) that is vulnerable to fraud. Indeed,
the black economy expands substantially.
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Unemployment
This EITC reduces the replacement rate for low-skilled workers more substantially
than the other EITCs explored above. Through skill-specific wage formation, this de-
cline in the replacement rate reduces low-skilled wages, thereby boosting demand for
low-skilled labor. Moreover, the lower replacement rate stimulates search and lowers
the reservation wage, thereby facilitating the matching process for low-skilled labor.
Accordingly, the unemployment rate for the low skilled drops more substantially than
under the EITCs analyzed above.
Trade-offs
The comparison between an EITC that depends on annual incomes and an EITC
that depends on hourly wages reveals a trade-off between two objectives: increasing the
participation rate of partners and reducing the unemployment rate for the low skilled.
An EITC that depends on annual incomes advances the first objective, while an EITC
that depends on hourly wages is more effective in cutting low-skilled unemployment.
This trade-off is similar to that uncovered in studies for the U.S. and the U.K. (see, e.g.,
Blundell e.a. (2000)). In these countries, the EITC depends on household rather than
individual incomes. The advantage is that the tax incentives can be better targeted
at low-income households who often face high replacement rates, thereby stimulating
employment of primary wage earners and single mothers. The disadvantage, however,
is that income effects and higher marginal tax rates in the phase-out range harm labor-
supply incentives facing secondary earners with working partners. This illustrates how
reducing one obstacle to employment may increase another obstacle.
Another trade-off involves the quality versus the quantity of labor supply. Com-
pared to an EITC that depends on annual incomes, an EITC that depends on hourly
wages enhances the quantity of labor supply (in hours) but harms its quality (in terms
of human capital).
Targeting the EITC The last two columns of Table 8 show the effects of two EITC’s
(based on hourly wages) that are phased out more rapidly than the previous experiment,
namely, at 150% (the fourth column) and 130% (the fifth column) of the minimum
wage. Fewer people fall in the phase-out range, but those who remain in the phase out
range face even higher marginal tax rates. The advantage of more targeting is that the
maximum credit for people who earn the minimum wage rate can be larger, thereby
cutting the replacement rate of the unskilled more substantially. The disadvantage is
that the marginal tax rate in the phase-out range increases more sharply and the (larger)
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decline in the replacement rate applies to fewer persons.
A moderately targeted version of the EITC (in the fourth column of Table 8)
is slightly more effective in reducing the aggregate unemployment rate than the most tar-
geted EITC (in the fifth column of Table 8). Also, compared to the less targeted EITC
(in the third column of Table 8), the moderately targeted EITC is more effective in re-
ducing the aggregate unemployment rate. This suggests that an inverse U-shaped curve
describes how the effectiveness of the EITC in cutting unemployment varies with the
degree of targeting. Hence, moderately targeting the EITC seems the most effective way
to reduce the overall unemployment rate. At the same time, these simulations illustrate
the drawbacks of targeting: more targeting implies that more workers remain unskilled.
Indeed, the adverse shift in the skill composition boosts unskilled employment at the
expense of low-skilled employment and limits the decline in unskilled unemployment.
5.2.4 targeted SSC cut versus targeted EITC
A comparison between the targeted cut in SSC paid by employers (see the second column
in Table 7) with a similar targeted EITC (see the last column in Table 8) reveals that
the SSC cut is more effective in fighting unemployment among the unskilled but less
effective in reducing aggregate unemployment. The SSC cut enhances the efficiency of
the matching process primarily through lower minimum wage costs. This substantially
reduces unskilled unemployment because the minimum productivity standard is the
most restrictive factor in the matching process for the unskilled. Indeed, with rigid
wages, cuts in payroll taxes boost employment more than cuts in income taxes do (see
sub-section 3.1)
The EITC improves the matching process primarily through a lower replacement
rate reducing the reservation rate of the unemployed. A lower reservation wage is less
important for the matching process of the unskilled than a lower minimum productivity
standard. However, a lower replacement rate also moderates wages in collective bargain-
ing. This makes the targeted EITC more effective in reducing aggregate unemployment.
The substantial decline in the replacement rate produced by the EITC is associ-
ated with a decline in the current incomes of transfer recipients. In case of a targeted
SSC, in contrast, benefit recipients are better off because wages (to which benefits are
linked) rise rather than fall. Tables 9 and 10 illustrate these income effects. This table
uses MIMIC’s search model to compute the welfare effects of the various policies con-
sidered here. The temporal welfare gains correspond to the static welfare effects (i.e.
abstracting from changes in employment prospects). For the unemployed, the measure
56
corresponds to after-tax income in unemployment (analogous to B in sub-section 3.2).
The intertemporal welfare effects incorporate changes in future employment prospects
(for the unemployed analogous to U r in sub-section 3.2). For the unemployed, the con-
trast between the temporal and intertemporal measures can be striking. In particular,
whereas the EITC produces temporal losses for the unemployed, the intertemporal gains
for the unemployed are large because employment prospects improve substantially as a
result of lower unemployment rates. The scope for Pareto-improving policies increases
substantially if one considers the impact on life-time rather than static incomes.71
6 Optimal redistribution
We now turn to a model of risk-averse agents with heterogeneous abilities. Accordingly,
progressive taxes not only affect the efficiency of the labor market but also insure agents
against the risk of being born with heterogenous abilities. Moreover, in addition to an
extensive labor-supply margin, we allow taxes to impact labor supply on the intensive
margin. Hence, whereas progressive taxes may stimulate job search, they may harm
the incentives of workers to exert effort and work long hours after workers have found a
job. Compared to the analysis in section 4, we thus include both an additional benefit
of progressive taxation (namely income redistribution) and an additional cost (namely
lower labor supply on the intensive margin). As another extension, welfare benefits
may be set optimally. Moreover, the income tax does not have to be linear, but may
be non linear as the government can observe individual labor incomes. Furthermore,
the government can imperfectly monitor the search effort of agents. This allows us to
investigate how the monitoring technology affects the optimal welfare benefit and the
optimal tax system.
In order to incorporate the additional complications of heterogenous, risk-averse
agents with endogenous work effort, we simplify the model of section 4 in two ways.
First, we abstract from wage bargaining and search (and the associated externalities) at
the demand side of the labor market: workers are paid their marginal product.72 Second,
we simplify the formulation of search at the supply side so that the search margin is
relevant for low-skilled workers only. Our formulation of labor-market matching allows
for two types of unemployment: first, involuntary unemployment of high-skilled agents
and, second, voluntary unemployment of low-skilled agents who do not face sufficient
71
Note, however, that even an EITC is not without costs, as public spending must be cut.
72
In terms of the model of section 4, β = 1 and η = 0 so that the Hosios condition is met.
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incentives to search. As regards this last type of unemployment, optimal unemployment
benefits in effect set a wage floor below which agents no longer search for work. Hence,
the desire to protect the involuntary unemployed produces an optimal rate of voluntary
unemployment.
6.1 The model
The economy is populated by agents featuring homogeneous preferences but heteroge-
neous skills. A worker of ability (or skill or efficiency level) n working E hours (or
providing E units of work effort) supplies nE efficiency units of homogeneous labor.
With constant unitary labor productivity, these efficiency units are transformed in the
same number of units of output. With output as the numeraire, the before-tax wage
per hour is thus given by exogenous skill n. Hence, overall gross output produced by
a worker of skill n, Z(n), amounts to Z(n) = nE(n). Since workers collect only labor
income, this gross output Z(n) corresponds to total gross (i.e. before-tax) income col-
lected by a worker of that skill n. The density of agents of ability n is denoted by f(n),
and F (n) represents the corresponding cumulative distribution function. The support
of the distribution of abilities is given by [n
0
, n
1
], while f (.) is differentiable.
Workers share the following quasi-linear utility function over consumption C and
hours worked (or work effort) E
u(C,E) = v (C)− E,
where v(C) is increasing and strictly concave: v′ (C) > 0, v′′ (C) < 0 for all C ≥ 0. The
specific cardinalization of the utility function affects the distributional preferences of
a utilitarian government. In particular, the concavity of v(.) implies that a utilitarian
government aims to fight poverty. In other words, such a government wants to insure
agents against the risk of a low consumption level.
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and Boadway,
Cuff and Marchand (2000), utility is linear in work effort E and separable in work effort
and consumption C. This has three important consequences. First, consumption C is
not affected by income effects. A higher average tax rate thus induces households to
raise work effort E rather than to cut consumption C. Second, the specific quasi-linear
utility function allows for a closed-form solution of the standard optimal income tax
problem. Third, a utilitarian government cares only about aggregate work effort in the
economy. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of consumption (i.e. the
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alleviation of poverty) rather than an equal distribution of work effort over the various
agents.
In line with the optimal income tax literature, the government is assumed not to
be able to observe skills n but to know the distribution function f(n) and before-tax
income of each individual Z(n). We depart from the standard optimal tax literature by
incorporating job search: agents have to search for a job and the government can only
imperfectly monitor agents’ search effort (see below). In particular, we allow agents to
adjust their labor supply not only on the intensive margin (i.e. by varying hours of work)
but also on the extensive margin (i.e. by deciding whether or not to look for a job). In
particular, by searching with intensity X ∈ [0, 1], agents find a job with probability X.
Agents’ search costs γ(X) are given by
γ(X) =
{
γX if X ∈ [0, X¯]
+∞ otherwise,
where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter representing the magnitude of the search costs. X¯ < 1
captures the idea that agents may fail to find a job, even if they search at full capacity. By
modelling the costs and effectiveness of search, the parameters γ and (1− X¯) represent
labor-market imperfections that give rise to unemployment. Agents thus differ in both
ability n and employment status and face two types of risks: being born with low ability
n and being involuntarily unemployed.
If an agent does not succeed in finding a job, (s)he receives a welfare (or social
assistance) benefit B ≥ 0.73 An agent who does not search for a job, while (s)he is
expected to look for a job by the government has a probability p
c
∈ 〈0, 1〉 of receiving a
penalty π ≥ 0. This penalty is in the form of lost leisure time.
An agent of ability n who is expected to search by the government searches at full
capacity if and only if
−γX¯ + X¯U (n) +
(
1− X¯
)
v (B) ≥ v (B)− p
c
π (20)
The linear specification of the search cost function implies that a worker either does not
search at all (and is voluntarily unemployed) or searches at the level X¯ (and faces a
probability of (1− X¯) of involuntary unemployment).
73
An alternative interpretation of B is a categorial unemployment insurance benefit. Indeed, the
benefit is paid only to those who have not found a job. In most countries, however, unemployment
benefits depend on the previously earned wage and are thus likely to increase with ability n. This is the
main reason why we interpret B as a social assistance benefit, i.e. the minimum income level provided
by the government. Another interpretation of B is an early retirement or disability benefit that is paid
if an agent does not work.
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After a worker has found a job, (s)he has to determine her work effort. Ex-post
utility of a type n agent who finds a job is determined by type n’s choice of gross income
Z:
U (n) = max
Z
{
v
(
Z − T˜ (Z)
)
−
Z
n
}
, (21)
where T˜ (Z) denotes the tax schedule as a function of gross income Z. We can write
T˜ (n) = T (Z (n)) , since type n chooses gross income Z (n) in equilibrium. The envelope
theorem yields the first-order incentive compatibility constraint74
U ′ (n) =
Z (n)
n2
. (22)
The utilitarian government maximizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e. expected util-
ity before ability and labor market status have been revealed)
Ω ≡
∫
n
1
n
0
−γX (n) +X(n)[U(n) + ξ]+ (1−X (n)) [v (B)− κe(n)] f(n)dn,
where κe(n) represents the expected penalty for type n with dκe(n)/dn ≥ 0. We al-
low for positive employment externalities ξ > 0. If these externalities are positive, the
government attaches more value to work than individual agents.
The government faces the following budget constraint∫
n
1
n
0
f (n)X (n) [B + T (n)]dn = G+B, (23)
where G represents exogenously given exhaustive government expenditure, and T (n) ≡
Z (n)− C (n) denotes the tax paid by type n. The government employs the non-linear
income tax and welfare benefits to optimize social welfare and takes public spending G
and the search monitoring and penalty system as given.
6.2 The optimal tax problem
In optimizing social welfare, the government faces three constraints: the incentive com-
patibility constraint (22), the participation constraint (20), and the government budget
74
The second-order condition for the agents’ optimal choice of consumption and gross income implies
that consumption and gross income are non-decreasing in type n. Boone and Bovenberg (2003a) analyze
these constraints (and the associated bunching implications) in depth and argue that they are not
relevant for understanding optimal taxation and welfare benefits at the bottom of the labor market.
We therefore ignore these constraints here and refer the interested reader to Boone and Bovenberg
(2003a).
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constraint (23). Since Z (n) ≥ 0, incentive compatibility (22) implies that utilities do
not decline with skill (i.e. U ′ (n) ≥ 0). Accordingly, if the participation constraint
U (n) ≥ γ + v (B) − κe(n) is met for skill n¯, it is met also for higher skills n > n¯.
Defining n
w
as the lowest skill that looks for work, we thus have X (n) = 0 for n < n
w
and X (n) = X¯ for n ≥ n
w
. The agents with skill n < n
w
can be viewed as being vol-
untarily unemployed. The higher skills n > n
w
look for work but may be involuntarily
unemployed (if X¯ < 1). The productivity level n
w
is called the minimum productivity
level. It is in fact the minimum gross wage implied by the welfare and tax systems.
These observations allow us to formulate the social planner’s problem as75
max
n
w
,U(.),Z(.),
B
F (n
w
) v (B) + [1− F (n
w
)]− γ
X
X¯ +
(
1− X¯
)
v (B)
+
∫
n
1
n
w
{
X¯U(n)f(n)− λ
U
(n)
[
U ′(n)−
Z(n)
n2
]
+ λ
E
[
f(n)X¯T (n)
]}
dn
−λ
E
{
B
[
F (n
w
) + (1− F (n
w
))
(
1− X¯
)]
+G
}
−η
w
(
γ − U(n
w
) + v(B)−
p
c
X¯
π
)
, (24)
where T (n) ≡ Z (n) − C (n) = Z (n) − v−1
(
U (n) + Z(n)
n
)
. λ
U
(n) represents the La-
grange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint, and λ
E
stands for the mul-
tiplier of the government budget constraint. η
w
denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the
participation constraint for type n
w
. It measures the social value of increasing employ-
ment by forcing more people to search, and can therefore be interpreted as the value of
a work test (and the required information on search intensity) inducing more skills to
look for work.
Boone and Bovenberg (2003b) derive the first-order conditions for the optimal tax
problem and establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If γX¯ > p
c
π, employed agents of type n > n
0
face positive marginal tax
rates. If in addition X¯ < 1−n
0
f (n
0
) , there is voluntary unemployment (i.e. n
w
> n
0
),
marginal taxes are positive at the bottom (i.e. τ (n
w
) > 0), and the following relationship
holds at the minimum productivity level76
τ (n
w
)Z(n
w
) = (B + T (n
w
)) +
ξ − π pc
¯
X
λ
E
. (25)
75
Instead of C (n) , we employ U (n) as a control variable in order to facilitate the inclusion of first-
order incentive compatibility (22) into the optimization problem.
76
This expression holds also if the welfare benefit is fixed exogenously.
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The inequality γX¯ > p
c
π implies that search costs are so high that agents can
be induced to search only if they can expect higher consumption levels in work than
in unemployment. Since the unemployed enjoy less consumption than workers, the
government wants to redistribute resources away from the employed skills n > n
w
to the
unemployed skills n < n
w
. This desire to redistribute towards the unemployed results
in positive marginal tax rates for all workers, including the marginal workers with skill
n
w
.
The left-hand side of inequality 1−X¯ > n
0
f (n
0
) stands for involuntary unemploy-
ment among the skills that are actively searching for a job. Hence, if these labor-market
imperfections as measured by this involuntary unemployment 1 − X¯ are substantial,
voluntary unemployment (i.e. n
w
> n
0
so that the least skilled do not look for a job)
becomes optimal. Intuitively, to avoid poverty among the substantial numbers of invol-
untarily unemployed, the welfare level B is set at such high levels that the participation
constraint becomes binding and the least skilled workers no longer search for work, espe-
cially if these workers feature only low labor productivity (i.e. n
0
is small). The desire to
combat poverty among the low skilled and the involuntarily unemployed agents without
imposing excessive distortions on the work effort of high-skilled agents thus optimally
creates additional, voluntary unemployment.
To interpret expression (25), we first consider the case without employment ex-
ternalities and penalties (i.e. ξ = π = 0). In that case, the right-hand side of (25)
represents the direct budgetary implications of raising employment by reducing n
w
: by
bringing a marginal worker into work, the government saves a welfare benefit B and
collects additional tax revenue T (n
w
). The indirect implications, namely the effects on
other workers, are captured by the left-hand side of (25). Bringing a marginal type n
w
into work encourages workers who are marginally more skilled to work less hard — as
they can now mimic type n
w
. An optimal tax system balances the welfare implications
of this latter behavioral response on the intensive margin of the more productive workers
(represented by the left-hand side of (25)) with the budgetary implications of the behav-
ioral response on the extensive margin of the marginal workers. The government thus
faces a trade-off between obtaining revenues from either inducing more agents to search
or encouraging a smaller group of agents to work harder. As a result, the distortion on
the extensive margin (i.e. the right-hand side of (25)) should equal the distortion on the
intensive margin (i.e. the left-hand side of (25)).
In this particular case (i.e. ξ = π = 0), the progressiveness of the income tax is
directly related to the level of welfare benefits. To see this, we rewrite (25) as τ(n
w
)−
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T (n
w
)
Z(n
w
)
= B
Z(n
w
)
= B
C(n
w
)
[
1− T (nw)
Z(n
w
)
]
. For the least-skilled worker, the marginal tax rate
τ (n
w
) minus the average tax rate T (nw)
Z(n
w
)
is directly related to the replacement rate B
C(n
w
)
.
In particular, the tax system is progressive at the minimum productivity level n
w
if and
only if the welfare benefit is positive. This result resembles the corresponding result on
optimal progression in section 4. In particular, if the Hosios condition holds, this latter
section establishes also that the income tax is progressive if and only if the welfare
benefit is positive. An important difference is, however, that in section 4 the search
margin is not distorted in the optimum (i.e. τ
a
+ B = 0 so that at a wage level of B,
workers collect a tax subsidy of −τ
a
= B). In the presence of an extensive labor-supply
margin, in contrast, the distortions on the search margin have to be traded off against
the distortions in work effort. Hence, the search margin remains distorted in equilibrium
as the tax on search B + T (n
w
) is positive.
We now turn to the case with positive employment externalities ξ > 0. In that
case, ceteris paribus the gross replacement rate B
Z(n
w
)
, 77 the gap between the marginal
tax and average tax rates widens at the minimum productivity level. Intuitively, with
positive employment externalities, the government wants to subsidize search of unskilled
workers in order to have these workers internalize the positive externalities from search.
These subsidies are financed by higher skilled agents so that marginal tax rates increase
and the tax system becomes more progressive. An alternative way to understand why
employment externalities tend to make the tax system more progressive and therefore
reduce work effort of high-skilled workers is that positive employment externalities can
be viewed as implicit taxes on search. With a larger overall tax on search, the optimal
trade-off between distortions on the intensive and extensive margins demands that the
explicit tax on search (i.e. the extensive margin) is reduced and that the tax on effort
(i.e. the intensive margin) is raised. If the employment externalities are large enough
and the revenue requirements are only small (so that the marginal tax rate τ (n
w
) can
be small), search may even be subsidized in equilibrium (i.e. B + T (n
w
) < 0).
With penalties on inadequate search (i.e. πp
c
> 0), the government reduces the
search distortions originating in the welfare system and can rely less on explicit search
subsidies for low-skilled labor. With less need to subsidize the low skilled, the income
77
Equation (25) holds also with an exogenous benefit level. If B is not optimally set, however, τ(n
w
)
may be negative (see Boone and Bovenberg (2003a)). With positive search externalities, the optimal
welfare benefit B will typically be lower than without positive search externalities. Indeed, the search
externalities will be internalized by reducing both B and T (n
w
). Indeed, redistribution away from
workers towards the poorer unemployed becomes more problematic.
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tax system has to be less progressive. Hence, compared to positive employment ex-
ternalities, the penalty system exerts exactly the opposite effect on marginal tax rates
facing workers. Indeed, whereas positive employment externalities can be viewed as an
implicit tax on search, the penalty system works as an implicit subsidy on search. If the
penalties are strong enough to internalize the employment externalities (i.e. π pc
¯
X
> ξ),
the penalty effect dominates. Hence, (25) together with τ (n
w
) > 0 (see Proposition 1)
implies that search is necessarily taxed (i.e. B+T (n
w
) > 0). Intuitively, the net tax on
search helps to redistribute resources away from workers to the unemployed, who are
poorer than the workers.
The monitoring system allows the government to alleviate the distortions imposed
by the welfare system on the search margin.78 It thus alleviates the distortions from
redistribution resources away from workers to poorer unemployed. In particular, the
agents who are required to search collect B − π pc
¯
X
/λ
E
rather than B in unemployment.
As long as B − [π pc
¯
X
/λ
E
] > 0, the welfare system distorts search and the tax system is
progressive at the minimum productivity level.
7 Conclusions
The link between taxes and labor-market performance depends crucially on non-tax
institutions. In particular, the impact of taxes on wages and unemployment depend on
how wages are set and on welfare and unemployment benefits. Indeed, a key channel
through which taxes affect unemployment is the effective replacement rate. The highest
effective tax rates on work typically originate in welfare and unemployment benefits that
are withdrawn if work is found.
Changes in the tax structure can cut unemployment if they succeed in shifting the
tax burden unto the unemployed, thereby reducing the effective replacement rate. More-
over, whether a higher tax burden raises unemployment depends crucially on whether
the unemployed share in the higher tax burden or not. These two insights explain how
revenue neutral environmental tax reforms can create a double dividend by producing
not only a cleaner environment but also a lower level of unemployment. How unemploy-
ment benefits are indexed is crucial in determining whether a change in the tax structure
can affect the effective after-tax replacement rate and whether a higher tax burden is
78
Whereas we thus model the benefits of monitoring, we do not specify the costs of monitoring. We
thus can not compute optimal monitoring levels.
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shared by the unemployed.79 In particular, an environmental tax reform can shift the
tax burden onto the unemployed by taxes on dirty consumption replacing labor income
taxes if unemployment benefits are linked to producer prices and not subject to per-
sonal income tax. Alternatively, this can be accomplished by taxes on dirty inputs into
production replacing consumption taxes if unemployment benefits are linked to wages.
In all these cases, environmental tax reform in effect succeeds in cutting the effective
after-tax replacement rate.80 With revenue-neutral reforms, the employment impact
also depends on the additional implicit tax burden associated with a better quality of
the public good of the environment. A double dividend is feasible only if the benefit
recipients pay a more than proportional share of the larger supply of the environmental
public good (see Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998)).
The tax system may impact unemployment also through rigid market wages. If
statutory minimum wages prevent market wages from falling, tax policy can then in
effect offsets the implicit tax on employers imposed by workers by reducing payroll
taxes paid by employers. The question also applies here why these non-tax institutions
cannot be reformed directly but have to be changed indirectly through tax policy.
Another channel through which the tax system impacts unemployment is the pro-
gressiveness of the tax system. In particular, by taxing wage rises, progressive taxes
moderate wages, thereby reducing unemployment. However, progression may also in-
crease the effective net replacement rate if unemployment benefits are subject to tax.
This latter effect may in fact be stronger than the first one if gross replacement rates
and non-taxable incomes in unemployment are substantial. Moreover, even though
progressive taxes combat unemployment, they typically imply other costs, for example
reducing labor supply, work effort, human capital accumulation and labor mobility while
stimulating tax avoidance, tax evasion, jobs with substantial nontaxable non-pecuniary
benefits, and the informal and black economies.
Tax policy impacts the labor market not only through wage setting but also
79
We demonstrated that higher income or payroll tax rates can raise unemployment even though
productivity growth does not affect the unemployment rate. This may happen if the ’outside wage’ is
indexed to labour productivity in the formal sector. This case seems particularly relevant if the outside
option is employment in the untaxed, informal economy.
80
This raises the question why the government cannot cut the replacement rate directly but has to
rely on an environmental tax reform to do so. One reason may be that benefit recipients reap the
largest gains from the improvement in environmental quality. With environmental benefits offsetting
the decline in after-tax unemployment benefits, benefit recipients may favor an environmental tax
reform that cuts their after-tax incomes while they would not support a direct cut in the replacement
rate (see Bovenberg (1999)).
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through labor supply. The labor-supply effects of tax policy require microeconomic
analysis of specific, disaggregated groups (such as secondary part-time workers, low-
skilled agents and older employees close to retirement) in order to do justice to substan-
tial variation in effective marginal tax rates and labor supply elasticities. The general
equilibrium model MIMIC incorporates a disaggregated household model in a general
equilibrium setting. In addition to labor supply and wage determination, various other
ways through which taxes and benefits affect the labor market are incorporated, namely
the black economy, human capital accumulation, efficiency wages, costly job matching,
and search behavior of the unemployed.
The simulations with MIMIC reveal several trade-offs between various objectives.
These objectives include cutting unemployment in general and low-skilled unemploy-
ment in particular, stimulating the participation of women in the labor force, raising
the quality and quantity of labor supply (both in hours and in persons), and establishing
an equitable income distribution, including a reasonable income level for those dependent
on social benefits. Indeed, these objectives imply different priorities for how tax cuts
should be structured. In particular, cutting unemployment primarily requires widening
the gap between labor incomes and transfer incomes in unemployment. Stimulating
labor-force participation of women calls for widening the gap between, on the one hand,
after-tax incomes of households with two partners who are active on the formal labor
market and, on the other hand, after-tax incomes of households with a non-participating
partner. Such a larger income gap encourages partners to start participating in the labor
force so that the latter households turn into the former households. Raising the quan-
tity and quality of labor supply in the formal economy calls for widening the income
differentials between low formal labor incomes and high formal labor incomes.
The most effective way to fight economy-wide unemployment is through in-
work benefits. These benefits widen the gap between after-tax income from work and
net transfer income, thereby raising the reward to work compared to relying on social
benefits. This moderates wage costs, reduces reservation wages and encourages job
search. Wage moderation reduces social benefits if these benefits are linked to market
wages.
Targeting in-work benefits at the low skilled is most effective in cutting economy-
wide unemployment. This is because the gap between labor income and transfer income
is smallest for low-skilled workers. Hence, widening this small gap produces the largest
pay-off in terms of reducing unemployment. However, by decreasing the gap between
low and high labor incomes through a more progressive tax system for workers, a tar-
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geted EITC reduces the hours of labor supplied. The cost of higher marginal tax rates
in the phase-out range is particularly high in European countries, where marginal tax
rates are already quite high. The trade-off between cutting unemployment and raising
labor supply (in hours) can be mitigated by linking the EITC to hourly wages rather
than annual incomes and by reducing the EITC proportionally for small part-time jobs.
Doing so, however, raises the marginal tax burden on hourly wage increases, thereby
discouraging the accumulation of human capital and stimulating the black economy.
Moreover, whereas the tax cuts are better targeted at benefit recipients, the lower ben-
efits to small part-time jobs do not help to raise the labor-force participation of women.
This points to a trade-off between targeting tax cuts at small part-time jobs of partners
or at full-time jobs of breadwinners and singles earning low hourly wages.
Tax cuts in the higher tax brackets are most effective in raising the quantity and
quality of formal labor supply (in hours). Indeed, these policies widen the after-tax in-
come differentials between low and high labor incomes by reducing marginal tax rates.
However, cuts in higher tax brackets are less effective in reducing unemployment (by
widening the income gap between being in work and collecting unemployment benefits),
raising low-skilled employment, and stimulating female labor supply. Indeed, the con-
trast between cuts in the highest tax brackets and a targeted EITC reveals a trade-off
between raising the quality and quantity of labor supply and combatting unemployment.
We formalized the trade-off between high levels of labor supply and low unemploy-
ment rates in a model of optimal taxation with involuntary unemployment. In a model
with homogeneous households without an intensive margin of labor supply, a progressive
labor tax eliminates non-tax distortions on wage setting. In particular, a progressive
tax allows workers to commit not to expropriate specific investments of firms. This is
especially relevant if unions feature a short time horizon and thus set wages on the basis
of low short-run labor-demand elasticities rather than higher long-run labor-supply elas-
ticities. In other words, progressive taxes restore the efficient balance of power between
workers and employers. A progressive tax also corrects for the impact of the welfare
system on wage setting, thereby alleviating the adverse impact of the welfare benefit
on job creation and the unemployment rate. The benefit system thus determines the
optimal progressiveness of the labor tax: a higher welfare benefit is accompanied by
a higher in-work benefit so that the improved outside option of workers as a result of
the higher welfare benefit does not raise unemployment. The more progressive labor
tax depresses labor supply, but it is more efficient to reduce labor supply through lower
after-tax wages than through the discouraged-worker effect.
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In the presence of an intensive labor-supply margin, the government faces a trade-
off between obtaining revenues from either inducing more agents to search or encouraging
a smaller group of agents to work harder. In that case, therefore, the government
does not completely eliminate the impact of the welfare benefit on the unemployment
rate. In particular, the government balances the distortions on job creation and the
unemployment rate against those on hours worked and work effort.
The government can improve this trade off in various ways. First of all, agents may
insure themselves against the risk of involuntary unemployment through precautionary
saving and compulsory saving schemes so that the unemployment insurance benefits
paid to the involuntarily unemployed can be cut.81 Self insurance seems a particularly
attractive instrument for high-skilled agents who face relatively short unemployment
spells during their careers. In this connection, the government may want to relieve
liquidity constraints by offering loans to the unemployed.82 This combats the capital-
market distortions that may give rise to labor-market distortions. Compulsory saving
schemes with liquidity insurance in effect provide a stronger link between contributions
and insurance benefits on a micro level (see Sørensen (2003)). This protects incentives
to search for work, work hard and moderate wages.
For agents with low life-time incomes, self insurance does not work well. To protect
these agents against poverty, the government needs to transfer resources to these agents.
For these agents, other ways need to be found to improve the trade-off between the
extensive and the intensive margins. In particular, the government may collect more
information by monitoring job search and imposing penalties on less active job search.83
In this connection, workfare may also play a role, even though it may to some extent
81
Indeed, the desire to provide income to involuntarily unemployed agents creates distortions on the
extensive margin in the model laid out in section 7. If the government does not need to provide income
to the involuntarily unemployed, even the least skilled workers can be offered sufficient incentives to
look for jobs.
82
Table 10 suggest that lowering unemployment benefits may actually benefit the unemployed if the
unemployed do not face liquidity constraints. The reason is that lower unemployment benefits enhance
the probability of finding a job, thereby improving expected incomes in the future.
83
The government can also collect more information regarding why workers lost their jobs. If they
were laid off because of misconduct or if they quit voluntarily, the government may refuse unemployment
benefits. This may reduce the wage pressure from higher unemployment benefits (see van der Ploeg
(2003)). Higher categorical benefits for verifiable disabilities (so-called ’tagging’) may also provide
valuable insurance without inducing moral hazard. Indeed, the trade-off between efficiency and equity
originates in assymetric information about the skills and behavior of agents. The agencies paying
welfare and unemployment benefits typically collect much more information about the skills and health
of benefit recipients than the tax office does about taxpayers.
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crowd out private employment. In particular, the mere threat of being put on workfare
is likely to boost job search of able individuals and prevent nonworkers who highly value
leisure84 from claiming unemployment benefits (see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003)).
Workfare can thus be seen as a way to redistribute resources to low-skilled agents who
are involuntarily unemployed.
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9 Appendix
To establish (19), we linearize the following equations characterizing the decentralized
equilibrium
γ′(X) = m(θ)
(
Y − Π−
G +B
m(θ)
)
, (26)
cθ
m(θ)
= Π. (27)
To derive the first equation, we have substituted the government budget constraint
Xm(θ)Y = Xm(θ) [W +Π] + (1− Xm(θ))B+ G to eliminate the after-tax wage W
from (16). The second equation follows from (15) and (18).
Loglinearization yields
(
X˜
θ˜
)
=
1
cθ(1−η)
m(θ)
(
Xγ′′(X)− G+B
X
)
(
cθ(1−η)
m(θ)
m(θ)η (Y −Π)
0 Xγ′′(X)− G+B
X
)(
−m(θ)ΠΠ˜− G
X
G˜− B
X
B˜
ΠΠ
)
.
(28)
We thus have (the second equality follows from (27))
X˜
Π˜
=
Πm(θ)
cθ(1−η)
m(θ)
(
Xγ′′(X)− G+B
X
) [− cθ
m(θ)
(1− η) + η(Y −Π)
]
=
Πm(θ)
cθ(1−η)
m(θ)
(
Xγ′′(X)− G+B
X
) [−Π+ ηY ]
=
{
≥ 0 if Π ≤ ηY
< 0 if Π > ηY
. (29)
Hence, X and thus welfare is maximized if Π = ηY. Using (15) to eliminate Π, we arrive
at the expression for the optimal tax τ
a
in (19). QED
Table 1. Indicators of labor market performance, 2001 
Labour force Unemployment Employment/population Average hours worked Employment indicator (d) Employment/population ratio Long-term unemployment 
participation rate (%) (c) rate (%) (c) ratio (%) (c) per person in employment for older workers (55-64) share (e)
UK 74,9 4,8 71,3 1711 58,7 52,2 27,7
Sweden 79,3 5,1 75,3 1603 58,0 67,0 22,3
Finland 74,6 9,2 67,7 1694 55,1 45,9 26,2
Denmark 79,2 4,2 75,9 1482 54,1 56,6 22,2
Ireland 67,5 3,7 65,0 1674 52,3 46,6       55,3 (b)
Spain 65,8 10,5 58,8 1816 51,3 39,2 44,0
Greece 62,1 10,4 55,6 1921 51,3 38,0 52,8
Netherlands 75,7 2,1 74,1 1346 48,0 39,3       43,5 (b)
Germany 71,6 8,0 65,9 1467 46,5 36,8      51,5 (a)
France 68,0 8,8 62,0 1532 45,7 36,5 37,6
Belgium 63,6 6,2 59,7 1528 43,9 25,2 51,7
Italy 60,7 9,6 54,9 1606 42,4 18,6 63,4
Portugal 71,8 4,3 68,7 n.a. n.a. 50,3 38,1
Austria 70,7 4,0 67,8 n.a. n.a. 27,4 23,5
Luxembourg 64,2 1,9 63,0 n.a. n.a. 24,8 27,6
US 76,8 4,8 73,1 1821 64,0 58,4 6,1
Canada 76,5 7,3 70,9        1801 (a) 61,4 48,3 9,5
Japan 72,6 5,2 68,8        1821 (a) 60,2 62,0 26,6
OECD Europe 66,8 8,6 61,1 n.a. 37,9 40,4
Total OECD 69,8 6,4 65,3 n.a. 48,4 27,5
Source: OECD (2002a) 
(a) Data refer to 2000
(b) Data refer to 1999 
(c) Persons aged 15-64 years
(d) (column 3 x column 4)/2080
(e) The share of long-term (12 months and over) in employment in total unemployment
n.a. Not available
Table 2. Effective tax rates on labor Income, 1999
Total average tax rate (ta) Total marginal tax rate (tm) for a single-person household
% of gross labor costs % of gross labor costs
0,67*APW (a) APW (a) 1,67*APW (a) 0,67*APW (a) APW (a) 1,67*APW (a)
UK 37,2 41,4 43,7 49,4 49,4 41,9
Sweden 59,9 61,3 64,9 64,6 62,8 71
Finland 53,9 57,7 63,3 63,6 67,2 70,7
Denmark 54,9 57,4 63 62,4 62,4 71,9
Ireland 37,1 45,8 53,8 47,2 66 63,4
Spain 42,7 46,9 50,1 52,3 53,8 56,4
Greece 45,2 46,4 50 48 53,4 61,7
Netherlands 50 53,4 53,3 60,6 65 58,1
Germany 55 59,2 62,5 66,1 68,9 68,9
France 52,1 58,4 59,8 78,7 62,5 60,9
Belgium 59,3 64,2 68,4 71,9 72,8 75,7
Italy 54,5 57 59,8 59,8 63,6 63,6
Portugal 43,1 45,7 50,1 50,6 51,3 57,9
Austria 52,7 56,2 60,1 60,9 64,5 68,6
Luxembourg 43,9 48 54,6 53,3 60 67,1
US 35,2 37 42,2 40,4 40,4 51,5
Source: Cnossen (2001)
(a) APW stands for the income level of an average productive worker. For a definition, see OECD (2002b)
1Legend: ta = (a+ c)/ (1 + c), where a is the total direct average tax rate and c
is the average effective indirect tax rate.
tm = (m+ c) / (1 + c), where m is the total direct marginal tax rate.
APW = wage level of a single average production worker.
Notes: Taxes include direct taxes, i.e. personal income taxes, employers’ and em-
ployees’ social security contributions, and payroll taxes (if levied), plus indirect taxes,
i.e. VAT and excises. Member States are ranked in decreasing order of the employ-
ment/population ratio.
Table 3. Net replacement Rates for three family types at two earnings levels, 1999
After tax and including unemployment benefits, family and housing benefits in the first month of benefit receipt
  APW (a)   66,7% of APW (a)
Single Couple, 2 children Lone parent, 2 children Single Couple, 2 children Lone parent, 2 children
UK 46 49 49 66 54 55
Sweden 71 78 85 82 90 93
Finland 65 83 87 79 88 92
Denmark 63 73 78 89 95 96
Ireland 31 57 52 42 67 59
Spain 74 73 76 76 76 77
Greece 47 44 47 48 46 50
Netherlands 82 89 81 88 85 80
Germany 60 70 71 67 75 76
France 71 72 72 78 82 83
Belgium 64 64 65 85 79 81
Italy 42 53 50 39 49 47
Portugal 79 79 80 88 87 87
Luxembourg 82 87 87 82 88 88
Austria 60 76 73 61 82 78
US 58 57 58 59 49 49
Canada 62 91 91 62 97 97
Japan 67 64 70 82 77 82
After tax and including unemployment benefits, family and housing benefits in the sixtiest month of benefit receipt
APW (a) 66,7% of APW (a)
Single Couple, 2 children Lone parent, 2 children Single Couple, 2 children Lone parent, 2 children
UK 46 80 71 66 88 81
Sweden 54 85 59 79 110 70
Finland 53 89 62 73 100 69
Denmark 60 80 79 85 102 97
Ireland 31 56 56 41 66 64
Spain 23 39 37 32 57 51
Greece 8 10 11 8 11 12
Netherlands 60 71 61 74 85 76
Germany 54 65 63 63 71 71
France 30 42 43 43 59 60
Belgium 45 68 69 60 84 86
Italy 0 18 14 0 21 17
Portugal 49 63 64 70 87 87
Luxembourg 50 75 59 70 93 82
Austria 55 72 69 58 78 74
US 7 46 38 10 59 48
Canada 24 62 60 35 81 80
Japan 33 68 61 49 87 84
Source: OECD (2002b)
(a) APW stands for the income level of an average productive worker. For a definition, see OECD (2002b)
Table 4. Average effective tax rates on transitions for two-earner couples, 1999 (a)
                   From unemployed breadwinner and non-employed partner to  From full-time employed breadwinner and non-employed partner to
Part-time (40%) employed Full-time employed breadwinner/  Full-time employed breadwinner/ Full-time employed breadwinner/
breadwinner/non-employed  partner non-employed partner part-time (40%) employed partner  full-time employed partner
UK 18 56 15 26
Sweden 87 84 29 34
Finland 86 87 21 34
Denmark 86 81 51 51
Ireland 101 61 21 34
Spain 166 76 18 19
Greece 103 43 16 18
Netherlands 84 92 50 46
Germany 52 75 51 53
France 80 72 32 37
Belgium 107 74 46 51
Italy 80 60 33 41
Portugal 174 81 15 20
Austria 142 79 21 30
Luxembourg 17 87 13 26
US 99 63 19 25
Canada 73 92 30 34
Japan 151 68 14 14
Source: OECD (2002b)
(a) If employed, the earnings are as a percentage of the full-time employed  salary of an average production worker.
1Table 5: Indexation of unemployment benefits
INDEXATION TO: BENEFITS UNTAXED BENEFITS TAXED
Cu = B/P c Cu = (1− T a)B/P c
consumer prices (b ≈ pc) cu = 0 = ce − wp + tl + ta + tc cu = −ta = ce −wp + tl + tc
producer prices (b ≈ 0) cu = −tc = ce −wp + tl + ta cu = −tc − ta = ce −wp + tl
after-tax wages (b ≈ w − ta) cu = ce = wp − tl − ta − tc not relevant
market wages (b ≈ w) cu = ce + ta = wp − tl − tc cu = ce = wp − tl − ta − tc
wage costs (b ≈ pc + w + t
L
) cu = ce + tl + ta + tc = wp cu = ce + tl + tc = wp − ta
Note: B,W,W p ≡ W (1 + T l) and P c stand for the level of the unemployment
benefit, the market wage, the producer wage and the consumer price, respectively. The
average personal income tax rate, the payroll tax rate and the consumer tax rate are
denoted by T a, T l and T c, respectively. The consumption of an employed and an
unemployed worker correspond to Ce = W (1−T a)/P c and Cu, respectively. Indexation
to wage costs may be interpreted as indexation to the consumption value of labour
productivity in the formal sector. Lower-case symbols stand for relative changes.
   Table 6. Macroeconomic effects of four cuts in taxes
First tax bracket Second tax bracket Third tax bracket Basic Allowance
                             percentage deviations
Private consumption 0,51 0,64 0,62 0,39
Exports 0,36 0,53 0,53 0,12
Imports 0,21 0,30 0,30 0,09
Formal Production 0,37 0,57 0,57 0,09
Black production -0,02 -0,20 -0,63 0,06
Employment 0,39 0,47 0,44 0,07
 - unskilled 0,46 0,20 0,20 0,18
 - low-skilled 0,50 0,17 0,07 0,10
 - high-skilled 0,35 0,60 0,60 0,04
Labour supply (pers.) 0,39 0,05 -0,02 -0,07
Labour supply (hours) 0,18 0,26 0,30 -0,04
 - breadwinners 0,03 0,28 0,54 -0,02
 - partners 0,39 0,02 -0,20 -0,16
 - single persons 0,26 0,31 0,08 -0,06
 - 55+ 0,09 0,42 0,77 0,03
Black labour (hours) -0,03 -0,14 -0,33 0,07
Training
 - unskilled and low-skilled 0,04 0,10 0,03 -0,05
 - high-skilled -0,09 0,65 0,89 -0,06
                                                     absolute deviations
Unemployment rate -0,13 -0,12 -0,08 -0,08
 - unskilled -0,21 -0,37 -0,27 -0,07
 - low-skilled -0,18 -0,12 -0,08 -0,13
 - high-skilled -0,10 -0,08 -0,04 -0,07
Share long term unemployment -1,29 -0,74 -0,47 -0,48
Replacement rate  (a) -0,03 -0,29 -0,18 0,15
Average tax burden (a) -0,35 -0,36 -0,33 -0,25
Marginal tax  burden (a) -0,32 -0,91 -1,07 -0,07
Government consumption (b) -0,17 -0,15 -0,14 -0,21
Source: Graafland et. al. (2001)
(a) Average over all households
(b) In percentage of GDP
Table 7. Macroeconomic effects of a reduction in payroll tax by 0,25% of GDP
General cut Targeted cut Vouchers for  
long-term unemployed
percentage deviations
Private consumption 0,48 0,43 0,44
Investment 0,25 0,24 0,18
Export 0,29 0,28 0,18
Imports 0,17 0,17 0,15
Production 0,29 0,27 0,20
Black production -0,02 1,42 -0,17
Employment 0,29 0,47 0,60
 - unskilled 0,40 3,92 4,40
 - low-skilled 0,36 0,05 0,52
 - high-skilled 0,25 0,04 0,06
Labour supply (pers.) 0,05 0,10 0,06
Labour supply (hours) 0,10 0,10 0,13
 - breadwinners 0,03 0,02 0,03
 - partners 0,19 0,31 0,26
 - single persons 0,13 0,19 0,19
 - 55+ 0,06 0,06 0,09
Black labour (hours) -0,02 1,45 -0,01
Training
 - unskilled and low-skilled 0,00 -0,83 0,04
 - high-skilled -0,02 -0,02 -0,03
absolute deviations
Unemployment rate -0,12 -0,23 -0,28
 - unskilled -0,20 -1,41 -2,99
 - low-skilled -0,17 -0,24 -0,16
 - high-skilled -0,10 -0,08 0,05
Share long term unemployment -0,75 -1,61 -4,24
Replacement rate (a) -0,01 -0,15 -0,19
Average burden (a) -0,32 -0,29 -0,31
Marginal burden (a) -0,20 0,38 -0,13
Government consumption (b) -0,18 -0,16 -0,17
Source: Graafland et. al. (2001)
(a) Average over all households
(b) In percentage of GDP
          Tabel 8. Macroeconomic effects of an Earned Income Tax Credit
fixed annual hourly 80 hourly 50 hourly 30
                          percentage deviations
Private consumption 0,56 0,30 0,51 0,51 0,51
Investment 0,47 0,12 0,46 0,48 0,45
Export 0,52 0,17 0,50 0,51 0,48
Imports 0,29 0,09 0,28 0,29 0,28
Formal production 0,55 0,13 0,53 0,55 0,52
Black production 0,09 -0,17 0,55 0,64 0,67
Employment 0,61 0,17 0,67 0,74 0,71
 - unskilled 1,00 1,50 2,89 3,81 4,07
 - low-skilled 0,72 0,14 0,47 0,28 0,08
 - high-skilled 0,51 -0,03 0,39 0,42 0,39
Labour supply (pers.) 0,11 0,58 0,11 0,13 0,16
Labour supply (hours) 0,19 -0,22 0,12 0,14 0,13
 - breadwinners 0,01 -0,33 -0,13 -0,12 -0,17
 - partners 0,44 0,54 0,42 0,50 0,59
 - single persons 0,28 -0,55 0,26 0,30 0,31
 - 55+ 0,10 -0,29 0,06 0,05 0,03
Black labour (hours) 0,09 -0,19 0,55 0,69 0,78
Training -0,08 -0,49 -0,94 -1,29 -1,42
 - unskilled and low-skilled -0,14 -0,14 -0,26 -0,37 -0,28
 - high-skilled -0,03 -0,07 -0,17 -0,24 -0,20
                               absolute deviations
Unemployment rate -0,26 -0,28 -0,36 -0,39 -0,37
 - unskilled -0,40 -0,16 -0,23 -0,22 -0,32
 - low-skilled -0,37 -0,47 -0,62 -0,70 -0,66
 - high-skilled -0,21 -0,25 -0,32 -0,35 -0,33
Share long term unemployment -1,64 -1,75 -2,30 -2,54 -2,45
Replacement rate (a) -0,42 -0,28 -0,60 -0,78 -0,74
Average burden (a) -0,50 -0,43 -0,51 -0,52 -0,51
Marginal burden (a) -0,14 0,63 0,80 0,67 0,38
Government consumption (b) -0,12 -0,16 -0,09 -0,08 -0,08
Source: Graafland et. al. (2001)
(a) Average over all households
(b) In percentage of GDP
Table 9. Welfare effects of cuts in income and payroll taxes
First tax Second tax Third tax Basic General Targeted Vouchers for long- 
bracket bracket bracket Allowance payroll tax payroll tax term unemployed
Temporal welfare percentages of base path current income
Unemployed (long-term)
 - unskilled 0,3 0,1 0,2 1,0 0,4 1,3 0,5
 - low-skilled 0,4 0,2 0,2 0,9 0,4 0,2 0,3
 - high-skilled 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,8 0,4 0,1 0,2
Employed
 - unskilled 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,6 0,5 2,6 1,0
 - low-skilled 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,6
 - high-skilled 0,5 1,1 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,4
Intertemporal welfare
Unemployed (long-term)
 - unskilled 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,9 0,7 3,8 9,0
 - low-skilled 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6
 - high-skilled 0,9 1,1 0,6 0,8 0,8 0,4 -0,1
Employed
 - unskilled 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,7 0,5 3,0 1,4
 - low-skilled 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
 - high-skilled 0,6 1,1 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,4
Source: Graafland et. al. (2001)
Table 10. Welfare effects of an Earned Income Tax Credit
fixed annual hourly80 hourly50 hourly30
Temporal welfare percentages of base path current income
Unemployed (long-term)
 - unskilled -0,3 -0,8 -1,2 -1,6 -1,8
 - low-skilled -0,2 -0,2 -0,1
 - high-skilled -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,1
Employed
 - unskilled 0,9 1,6 3,2 4,2 4,2
 - low-skilled 0,7 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,3
 - high-skilled 0,6 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
Intertemporal welfare
Unemployed (long-term)      
 - unskilled 0,9 0,8 1,5 1,9 2,0
 - low-skilled 1,1 1,0 1,5 1,7 1,5
 - high-skilled 1,1 1,0 1,4 1,5 1,4
Employed
 - unskilled 0,9 1,4 2,8 3,7 3,8
 - low-skilled 0,8 0,4 0,7 0,8 0,6
 - high-skilled 0,7 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,5
Source: Graafland et. al. (2001)
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